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ABSTRACT
The concept of harnessing the tides for energy is receiving renewed
attention in the maritime provinces of Canada and northeastern United States
where a scarcity of indigenous energy resources exists. While proposals for
. several small tidal power facilities are being considered in Maine, in Canada,
Nova Scotia officials are moving ahead with plans for a major tidal power project
(4,028 MW) in the Minas Basin in the Bay of Fundy. The vast majority of the
power generated from this facility is expected to be exported to the New York
and New England areas which have a greater energy demand than the maritime
provinces. Although tidal power facilities have been proposed for the Minas Basin
in the past, a recent update of the current economic feasibility of such a project
shows the benefits far surpassing the costs. However, while tidal power is
traditionally considered to have minimal impacts on the environment, there is
some scientific evidence which suggests that the proposed facility may affect the
tidal regime as far south as Cape Cod, Massachusetts due to the unique
oceanographic conditions found in the Gulf of Maine and Bay of Fundy. A recent
analysis undertaken through funding by the Maine State Planning Office indica tes
that such an alteration to the tidal regime could have far-reaching environmental
consequences ranging from loss of terrestrial habitats to possible weather
modification. In addition to these physical consequences however, this project
could have significant implications for environmental law.
This thesis examines both international environmental law and the domestic
laws of Canada and the United States which attempt to protect the transboundary
ii
environment. Canadian-United States practice with prior transboundary
environmental problems is examined with respect to how these disputes have been
settled in the past.
The results of this analysis suggest that there are several deficiencies in the
present international and domestic legal framework which do not adequately
protect the transboundary environment. The Boundary \Vaters Treaty of 1909 and
its working mechanism, the International Joint Commission do, however, appear
to provide the necessary base for addressing transboundary environmental
problems and need to be utilized to a greater extent in resolving environmental
disputes between the two countries.
iii
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
Assuming the construction of a proposed tidal power project in Canada on the
Bay of Fundy, subsequent alterations of the marine and coastal environments have
been projected to occur as a result of the dam. These alterations are believed not
to be limited to just local changes, but rather, changes throughout the Bay of
Fundy/Gulf of Maine region with impacts extending as far south as Cape Cod,
Massachusetts. Among the possible physical effects anticipated from the project
are increased tidal ranges and tidal currents and consequent modifications to the
coastal and marine habitats affected by such changes.
There is an old Roman law which reads "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas",
or roughly translated "you must not do with your property anything which can do
damage to your neighbor." It would appear, at least on a rudimentary level, that
this law might be broken by Canada's construction of the tidal power facility should
the pursuant environmental changes be perceived as damaging by the United States.
Such perceptions or actual changes could result in strained United States-Canadian
relations and possibly represent a breach of international environmental legal
obligations. Similarly, there may be domestic laws in Canada which protect the
transboundary environment that would likewise be broken should the construction of
a tidal facility result in subsequent changes to the United States environment.
Background and Issues
With demands for low-cost power in the maritime provinces of Canada and the
northeastern United States increasing, and with a relative scarcity of indigenous
2energy resources in these areas, officials in Nova Scotia are moving ahead with
plans for a proposed tidal dam project on the Bay of Fundy. The focus of the
Canadian effort centers around the Minas Basin, where a tidal power facility of
4,028 MW (roughly equivalent to four nuclear plants) is being considered. The
Tidal Power Corporation of Canada has recently updated a 1977 economic study
of the feasibility of Fundy tidal power. A cost-benefit analysis of the project
shows the ratio of benefits to costs through the year 2050 at somewhere between
2.45 and 3.0 depending on design. Fuel cost savings would far surpass the capital
and operating costs based on an allocation of 10% to the Maritimes, 45% to New
England, and 45% to New York.! When compared with alternate energy sources,
the benefits to the market areas for tidal were found similar to nuclear and
superior to coal.
There are generally considered to be about only fifty sites throughout the
world which are suitable for tidal power development. This lack of suitable sites
is related to two criteria which must be satisfied for development to be
considered practical. First, a tidal range large enough to produce a sufficient
head must be present. Second, the area to be impounded should be large, while its
connection to the sea should be relatively narrow to minimize construction costs.
A 240 MW project on the La Rance Estuary in France and a recently (summer
1984) completed project of similar size in the Annapolis Basin of Nova Scotia are
the only major tidal power facilities in operation today. While these projects are
small and the environmental changes associated with them are minimal, there is
the possiblity that other larger projects could be developed which might result in
major environmental" modifications. Historically, other projects have been
proposed since early in this century, but have proven infeasible following detailed
cost-benefit analyses. With changes in the world economic situation, the need to
3move away from fossil fuels, and the fact tha t tidal power is considered both non-
polluting and reliable, such projects are being given renewed attention.
Although tidal power is non-polluting in the traditional sense, it does result
in a number of significant environmental consequences which must be considered
during the initial planning phases. These can be divided into those occuring within
the impoundment area itself and those that occur on the seaward side of the
barrier. David Greenberg of the Bedford Institute of Oceanography in Nova
Scotia has developed a numerical model for purposes of describing and projecting
the impacts occuring outside the tidal barrage.2 The exact effect of the
construction of a tidal barrier depends upon its size and location within the entire
tidal system. The proposed Fundy tidal power development will enhance the
na tural tidal resonance of the Bay of Fundy and Gulf of Maine by shortening the
basin, bringing its tidal period closer to the natural period of the tidal wave.
Greenberg's model, which has received general acceptance throughout the
scientific community, indicates that an increase in the tidal range of from 2-30
centimeters would be produced beginning at the southern portion of the Bay of
Fundy and extending to south of Boston, Massachusetts)
Little consideration has been given to the environmental consequences of
this construction. Some research has been done by Canadians on the effects in
Canada, but the research on the impacts likely to occur in the United States is in
an infant stage.4 According to Dr. Peter Larsen of the Bigelow Laboratory for
Ocean Sciences in West Boothbay Harbor, Maine, there is so much momentum at
the present time for the development of tidal power in Nova Scotia that it cannot
be stopped. Dr. Larsen and his colleagues, through funding from the Maine State
Planning Office have recently completed a preliminary analysis of the tidal
project as to the environmental impacts most likely to be felt in the United
States.5
4The most recognizable impact of the proposed barrier outside of the
construction site is the loss of terrestrial habitats which is a function of the type,
slope, and wave exposure of the shore. The increased tides may have little or no
consequence on steep, rocky shores, such as those found on the northern coast of
Maine, but in low-lying areas such as beaches and tidal marshes, which are finely
tuned to tidal cycles and tide ranges, the changes could be substantial. These
consequences are likely to affect a significant number of people living in coastal
communities throughout northern New England, and may adversely affect the
economies of these communities.
As the move for tidal power grows, further studies will be required to assess
the true costs and benefits of developing this resource. While the benefits of tidal
power development in the Bay of Fundy may outweigh the costs in the long run,
the anticipated environmental modifications could result in legal and political
disputes between the United States and Canada analagous to the current acid rain
problem and the recently-resolved longstanding Garrison Diversion dispute.
A considerable amount of time and energy has been spent by those involved
-
in foreign relations, law, and political science in developing and subsequently
analyzing transboundary pollution law.6 Foremost among those laws, although
only customary and therefore not binding, are the basic principles established in
the United Nations Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment held in
1972.7 Two of these principles, Principles 21 and 22, spell out the responsibility
of states towards protection of the global environment and seek a coordinated
effort at devel?ping liability and compensation regimes for victims of
environmental damage caused by activities outside of their jurisdiction. These
principles are supported by numerous customary and treaty laws and by a long
history of practice. The United Sta tes and Canada in their longstanding
relationship as neighbors have set many of the standards by which transboundary
5environmental damage is viewed and have established an effective forum for
dealing with these problems. Yet much still needs to be done if we hope to
protect our transboundary environment, help others protect theirs, and ultimately
the global environment. It has been said that technology runs very far ahead of
la wyers and legislators, so the task is no small one.
Overview
In Chapter II, the history of tidal power is presented along with the
development of the proposed Bay of Fundy tidal power project. Also examined
are the nature of tides, the oceanography of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine
region, and the projected transboundary impacts of the proposed facility. An
update on the current status of the proposals and public reaction concludes the
chapter.
An analysis for provisions in existing international law which address the
responsibility of States to protect the transboundary environment is found in
Chapter III. The Stockholm Convention and supporting customary law are
examined, and a discussion of relevant treaty law which obligates States to
protect the environment is presented.
In Chapter IV, Canadian and United States environmental legislation is
discussed with consideration to those provisions which might be applied to the
proposed Fundy situation. These include environmental assessment procedures in
each country and, in the United States, the regulation of power inputs. Provincial
and state legislation is also briefly mentioned.
Canadian-United States environmental practice is reviewed in Chapter V
with a discussion of how disputes have been settled in the past, including an
examination of the mechanisms for dispute settlement. The Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909 and the International Joint Commission are presented as the key to
United States-Canadian environmental dispute resolution. The recent Garrison
6Diversion conflict and current acid rain problem are discussed as examples of the
complex transboundary problems which are now in the forefront of public
attention. Some analogies between these problems and possible Fundy problems
are discussed.
In Chapter VI, the problems with international law and United States-
Canadian domestic legislation with respect to protection of the transboundary
environment are summarized and some suggestions are made as to how these
might be strengthened. This chapter, and the thesis, conclude with a commentary
on the Fundy project and the role of the International Joint Commission as an
existing successful mechanism for conflict resolution. It is hoped that the further
interdependence of nations can be achieved by incorporation of some of the
suggestions offered in this thesis.
7CHAPTER I NOTES
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TIDES AND TIDAL POWER
Tides
Throughout history man has been fascinated by the rhythm of the tides,
those diurnal or semidiurnal rises and falls of sea level which are most
appreciated along coasts with a substantial range in tidal height.! Sir Isaac
Newton (1647-1727) was the first to satisfactorily explain the tides with his law of
gravitational attraction, although as early as the first century, Pliny the Elder
(AD 23-79) of Rome correctly attributed this rise and fall of the oceans to the
effect of the sun and moon. Newton's law states that the attraction between two
bodies is directly proportional to the square of the distance between them.2
Therefore, all celestial bodies affect the oceans to some degree, but it is the sun
and moon that are the most important; the sun, because of its large mass, and the
moon, because of its proximity to the earth.
The var ia tion in tides is caused by the fact tha t the gravitational attractions
of the sun and moon vary from place to place on the earth.3 Although the
a tmosphere and even the solid earth are similarly attracted to these celestial
bodies, it is only the effects on the oceans that are noticeable to the human eye.
The point on earth closest to the sun is most strongly attracted, resulting in a
mound of water being formed on this side. Conversely, the point on earth furthest
from the sun is least strongly attracted, and water bulges at this point also, as the
rest of the earth is pulled away. Although having much less mass than the sun,
the gravitational attraction of the moon has a similar effect, but it is its
9proximity to earth that makes it the dominant tide-producing "force; its pull is
more than double that of the sun.
Being cyclical in nature, tides can be predicted years in advance.
Simplistically, the deformation at any given time, latitude, and longitude can be
calculated by taking into consideration the rotation of the earth along with the
moon's orbit. When the moon changes its position so does the orien ta tion of the
tide-genera ting forces and the position of the "equilibrium tide." The concept of
an equilibrium tide is used to describe an ideal tide for a theoretical ocean devoid
of continents. Modern methods of tidal prediction are much more sophisticated,
and take into account some thirty variables altogether.f
When all three bodies are lined up, with either the moon and the sun on the
same side {new moon), or, on opposite sides of the earth (full moon), the tides
reinforce one another, creating the highest tides, referred to as "spring tides."
When out of phase, the two forces cancel one another and the tides become
progressively smaller, reaching a "neap tide" stage at quadrature (first and third
quarters).
The moon is the dominant factor controlling the period and height of the
tide. The moon passes over any given location once every 24 hours, 50 minutes,
and the elapsed time between successive high or low wa ters is called the tidal
period, typically 12 hours and 25 minutes. In some places, this tidal period occurs
only once in an earth day (diurnal), but in others it may occur twice (sernldlurnal),
Tides in the Ocean
Astronomical forces act primarily on large bodies of water (i.e., the oceans)
and the tidal response of the open ocean forces the tides in the less deep, adjacent
coastal waters. Each ocean basin responds to tidal forces in a different way due
to their different shapes and sizes. Meteorological effects created by high- and
10
low-pressure systems may also create their own tidal responses. Tidal responses
in a basin follow these general rules:
1. If the characteristic period of the standing wave in a basin is short, relative
to the period of the tide-generating forces, there is sufficient time for the
water level to be displaced in step with the tide-generating force. In such a
basin, an equilibrium tide would exist.
2. If the characteristic period of the standing wave is very long relative to the
period of the tide-generating force, there is insufficient time for the water
level to keep step with the tide-generating forces, and tides are small and
reversed. In other words, low tide occurs when high tide would have been
predicted and vice versa.
3. When the characteristic period of the standing wave in a basin is nearly the
same as the tide generating forces, high and low tide occur about when
predicted, but the height of the tide is much greater than expected. The
closer the correspondence between the two, the higher the tides. [This will
be shown to be the key element to understanding the Gulf of Maine/Bay of
Fundy pro jectionsJ 5
Finally, while only the rise and fall of water has been mentioned here,
another manifestation of this same cyclical phenomenon are the tidal currents
which accompany the changing water levels. Therefore, these are also important
considerations when discussing any projected alterations in the tidal regime.
Tidal Power Development
Early History
The concept of harnessing the energy of the tides has existed for centuries.
Early records indicate that tide mills were being worked along the Atlantic Coast
of Europe by the 11th century. One such installation in the Deben estuary in
Great Britain was mentioned as early as 1170.6 Remains of tidal mills have been
found among estuaries and inlets along the coasts of Brittany, England, and Spain.
The use of ,tidal power was not unique to Europe however, and in North
America tide mills were also common, especially in northern New England. Tide
mills were built where a cove or salt marsh creek could be dammed so as to make
a basin in which the water could be kept near the high tide level. This allowed
operation for about six hours of the lower stages of each of the two daily high
11
tides. In the early years of settlement, and extending well into the nineteenth
century, small coastal communities of New England used these tide mills to grind
grain and saw wood for the local populace)
While tide mills were generally scarce south of Cape Cod, one tidal mill was
built in Brooklyn, New York as early as 1636, and another facility in Rhode Island
used impressive twenty-ton wheels, eleven feet in diameter and twenty-six feet in
width.8 At Boston, tide mills were a principle source of energy.
A tide mill at South Harpswell, Maine, on Casco Bay was built in 1867 and is
said to have been the largest in the State of Maine and probably on the Atlantic
coast. The mill depended on a head created by da mming Basin Cove, a basin
about two miles in length, near the mouth. Corn was shipped from New York to
Portland and then transhipped to South Harpswell, where the mill operated about
twelve hours a day at an equivalent of 6,000 horsepower and ground some 50,000
bushels of grain annually. Rail transportation and the advent of steam power
rendered the operation unprofitable and it closed in 1885.9
Modern History of Tidal Power
While the age of engines and inexpensive fossil fuels spelled doom for the
practice of tidal energy, interest in developing tidal resources is now being
renewed as uncertain markets for non-renewable fossil fuels have caused energy
costs to rise. The need of many nations to become less dependent on imported oil
as a source of energy, along with increasing concern about the safety of nuclear
power has led to a growing interest in alternative sources of energy. This is
particularly true In northeastern North America where a relative scarcity of
indigenous energy resources exist.
Where oceanographic conditions are favorable, large scale tidal power
development can be considered a technically viable form of energy. The
advantages that tidal power has over conventional energy sources are numerous.
12
Unlike conventional hydropower, tidal power is not influenced by seasonal water
levels, floods, or droughts. While most operational modes only produce power on
an intermittent basis, necessitating integration of tidal power facilities with other
systems, power production is predictable years in advance. Since water is the
source of power, problems associated with fuel acquisition and waste product
disposal are avoided. Tidal power plants operate on the continuously varying
differences in levels between the water in the basin on the landward side of the
development and the water in the sea. The basin must be filled from the sea or
emptied to the sea as required by the operating mode of the power plant so that
production can be coordinated with the load curve of the power network with
which it is interconnected.l O
There are generally considered to be somewhere between twenty-five and
fifty sites throughout the world which are suitable for tidal power development
(see figure 1). This lack of suitable sites is related to the two criteria which must
be satisfied for development to be considered practical. First, a tidal range large
enough to produce a sufficient head must be present. Second, the area to be
impounded should be large, while its connection to the sea should be relatively
narrow to minimize construction costs. Until recently, a 240 MW tidal plant built
in the mid-1960s on the Rance Estuary in France by the National French Electric
Company was the only major tidal power facility in operation. A small .4 MW
plant has been operating in the Soviet Union since 1968, and a number of smaller
projects exist in China with an aggregate capacity of-about eight megawatts.! I
The South Kore~n government is currently spending three million dollars
developing plans for a 450 MW inner basin plant and an 810 MW outer basin plant
at Asan Bay.!2 The British are presently continuing their evaluation of a project
on the Severn Estuary, and have already completed extensive environmental
13
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studies. Other sites in this area are presently being examined along the coasts of
Brittany and Normandy. '
Worldwide, other areas which have been considered for large-scale tidal
power plants include the Gulf of San Jose in Argentina, the Schelde Estuary in the
Netherlands, the north coast of Brazil, and sites in Germany, Portugal, Pakistan,
Australia, and New Zealand.
North America
In the United States, two regions are considered especially appropriate for
large-scale tidal power projects.
In the western United States, the Knik Arm and Temagen Bay in the Cook
Inlet area of Alaska are considered the best areas for tidal power development.
However, interest in tidal power development here is not being given serious
consideration as ample quantities of other traditional regional energy resources
(hydro, oil) exist in the region to meet current and projected demands.
In the Gulf of Maine-Bay of Fundy region (see figure 2), however, interest in
tidal power development is high at the moment. There are at least three projects
being studied on the United States side of the border. The Passamaquoddy Indian
Tribe has done extensive studies on the potential for a 12 MW tidal unit on their
reservation in Perry, Maine. The United States Army Corps of Engineers is also
examining the Cobscook Bay area and is considering several possible tidal dam
configurations and operating modes. 13 This area has undergone studies before,
and considerable interest was genera ted previously during the FDR
administration. further south, a very small, private initiative is underway on
Vinalhaven Island in Penobscot Bay, and, if construction begins as planned, could
result in the first active tidal power plant in the United States)4 In addition, the
State of Maine has recently surveyed its shoreline to establish its cumulative tidal
power potential.
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Figure 2. The Gulf of Maine-Bay of Fundy region
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The Bay of Fundy Proposal
The highest tides in the world are known to exist in the upper Bay of Fundy.
Therefore, it is not surprising that tidal power interest should be focused here.
The first tidal power plant in the western hemisphere came on line at Annapolis
Royal, Nova Scotia in the summer of 1984. This project, designed to demonstrate
the utility of a Straflo turbine in the marine environment, consists of a 20 MW
low-head turbine fitted into a pre-existing barrage. Construction costs using this
type of turbine are 10-15% less than those associated with more conventional low
head turbines. Therefore, it is expected that the success of this pilot project
could have a significant impact on the feasibility of larger scale developments.
Several sites for large scale tidal power developments have been studied in the
upper Bay of Fundy in the past, but for the last few years extensive and intensive
technical, economic, and environmental consideration has been directed at one
site, in particular, designated B9, in the Minas Basin (see figure 3). This site is
now considered the most likely for large scale tidal power development and its
construction is being advocated by both private and governmental concerns in
Nova Scotia.
Selection of the Minas Basin Site
In 1969, the Atlantic Tidal Power Programming Board, a quasigovernmental
body, concluded that tidal power development in the Bay of Fundy was not
economically feasible under the existing conditions, but, that it might be if (1)
interest rates dropped; (2) a breakthrough occurred . in construction costs or
turbine costs; (~) pollution abatement requirements magnify the costs of
alternative sources; or (4) alternative sources become depleted.l 5
By 1972, sufficient changes had occurred in these factors and a major
evaluation ~tudy was instituted by the governments of Canada, New Brunswick,
and Nova Scotia. The report, released in 1977, showed that at least two sites--B9
-=_-::'
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Figure 3. Location of proposed tidal facilities in the Bay of Fundy
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in Minas Basin and A8 in Cumberland Basin (see figure 3)--had a benefit-cost ratio
of 1.2, and, therefore, were approaching economic viability.!6 Since that time,
technology, energy regulation policies, and energy costs have changed even
further and the interest and support for tidal power development has also shifted
from New Brunswick to Nova Scotia. The need to raise capital has turned
attention from the Cumberland Basin site, the one preferred by the 1977 study, to
a larger Minas Basin facility which could produce excess power for export and
encourage United States investment.
An update of the economic portions of the 1977 report was funded in 1981.
This report, "Fundy Tidal Power Update '82," contains the most favorable
economic forecast for tidal power to date, based on (1) the increased cost of
alternative sources of energy (specifically, the Update used displaced fuel costs in
its analysis); (2) changes in marketing strategies, which includes export of most of
the energy to the United States; and, (3) design changes, principally in turbine
design and construction procedures.V
Cost/Benefit Analysis of the B9 Barrage
While the typical benefit/cost ratio for hydroelectric projects which are
considered good investments by the United States Government is 1.5,18 the
Canadian Tidal Power Project is expected to return somewhere between $2.45 and
$3.00 for every $1.00 invested. These calculations are based on "an arbitrary but
reasonable, allocation of 10% to the Maritimes, 45% to New England, and 4'% to
New York".l9 The variability between projected benefits is principally due to
different construction methods. The majority of this savings is expected to be in
the area of saving of fuel costs, and, even under a worst case scenario which
assumed no escalation of fuel costs after 1981, the benefit/cost ratio for the B9
site was still 1.29/1. Thus B9 would retain a margin of profitability even if the
19
real value of fuel remained at 1982 levels in 1995 (projected start up date) and for
75 years beyond.20
Financial Feasibility
Two forms of financing were considered in the Tidal Power Update. The
first involved investment by a single company and the second by a joint venture.
Projections were made for both cases under the assumption of 10% infla tion from
1981 to the commissioning date (January 1, 1995). An interest rate of 15.23%,
corresponding to a 4.75% real interest was used.21 Using this method, capital
budgeting decisions are determined by market forces in the period in which the
outlays are made, thus allowing for a more accurate estimate.
The capital costs using either form of financing are high, with the joint
venture showing slightly lower costs of $21.4 billion as compared to $23.1 billion
for the single company. These amounts include the cost of transmission facilities.
While these costs might appear to preclude any serious consideration of the
project, it is expected that, under a wide variety of operating conditions, that
these capital costs could be recovered in a period of 10 to 20 years after
commissioning.22 Still, the securing of such large amounts of capital appears to
be the principal obstacle to overcome before construction of the barrage begins.
Description of the Proposed Project
There are three basic elements in the construction of a tidal power plant.
First, there must be a powerhouse or some type of setting for the generating units
(turbines). Secondly, there need to be sluiceways with gates for filling or
emptying of the controlled basins. Thirdly, dikes are needed as closures between
the power houses and the sluiceways (see figure 4).2 3
Tidal power facilities can operate on either the flood tide, the ebb tide, or
both. In a single-effect scheme, power is genera ted only by the water flowing in
one direction, either on the incoming tide or the outgoing tide. The optimum
20
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scale of the single-effect tidal-generating station proposed for the Minas Basin,
calls for 106 turbines, with a total capacity of 4,028 MW, and 60 sluices (see
figure 5»)4
The current design calls for using caissons to replace much of the originally
proposed dike system. These caissons include powerhouses, permanent sluices,
concrete cribs with temporary water passages, and cribs which allow no water to
pass. The short remaining gaps can be closed by dikes located for the most part
on flats which are dry at low tide. Therefore, dikes can be completed by normal
concrete dumping procedures within a few months of placement of the last
caisson.
Large differences in water levels between the basin and the sea must be
avoided in the period before permanent closure in order to keep current velocities
down. The proposed design uses cribs with temporary water passages to serve as
sluices until the final closure, and therefore, minimize this problem. It should be
noted that any design plans are not definite at this time, although this design
appears to be the preferred one, and which all subsequent calculations have been
based upon.
Physical Oceanography of the Gulf of Maine-Bay of Fundy
The Gulf of Maine is basically a rectangular basin. It is bounded by the
Maine and New Brunswick coasts on the west, the continental shelf on the east,
Cape Cod on the southwestern edge, and the Bay of Fundy and Nova Scotia to the
north. The seaward portion of it encompasses Georges_Bank, where depths are as
shallow as a few meters. The Northeast Channel leading into the Gulf from the
continental shelf is up to 360 meters deep in places. This channel leads into two
basins: the Wilkinson Basin, northeast of Cape Cod, and the Jordan Basin,
southwest of the entrance to the Bay of Fundy (see figure 2). The main body of
the Bay of Fundy lies in the northeastern section of the Gulf of Maine, and is
22
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about 170 km long. Its width varies from about 48 km at Cape Chignecto to 70
km as it opens out into the Gulf of Maine (see figure 3). The depths along the
center line of the Bay decrease gradually from 180 meters near the Gulf of Maine
to 40 meters at the head where it divides into Chignecto Bay and Minas Basin.25
Tides in the Gulf of Maine/Bay of Fundy
The tides in the Gulf of Maine/Bay of Fundy (hereafter designated
GOM/BOF) system are controlled by the tides on the open ocean boundary along
Georges Bank. The tidal range in the Bay of Fundy varies from 9 meters near the
mouth to a maximum of 15 meters at the head. Physiographic fea tures of the Bay
playa very important role in the amplification of its tides. The unique tidal
response of the GOM/BOF system is, in part, due to its separation by an abrupt
change in depth from the main body of the Atlantic at the edge of the continental
shelf. Here, the water changes in depth from 2,000 meters to 200 meters from
one side of the shelf to the other. As the heads of the Bay are approached, the
dual lateral and vertical convergence results in an amplifica tion of some 30-40%.
The Bay of Fundy tides are semi-diurnal with two high waters and two low
waters each with approximately the same height. The interval between the
transit of the moon and the occurrence of high water is nearly constant, and, as a
result, the tides are extremely regular with two tides of nearly the same
magnitude and pattern occurring each lunar day (24 hours and 50 minutes). It
takes 12 hours 25 minutes for the oceanic lunar tide (designated M) to complete a
cycle from one high tide to the next. The natural . oscillating period of the
GOM/BOF system is approximately 13 hours. This similarity in tidal periods leads
<.
to a resonance effect in which large oscillations in sea level occur.
The Greenberg Model
Dr. David A. Greenberg of the Bedford Institute of Oceanography in Nova
Scotia, has studied the GOM/BOF tidal regime and the effect that tidal power
24
development would have on it for over a decade. A recent paper, "A Numerical
Model Investigation of Tidal Phenomena in the Bay of Fundy and Gulf of Maine"
updates his earlier work.26
Tidal modelling is extremely difficult due to the large number of variables
involved. Greenberg's model uses equations of continuity and motion through a
grid with progressively smaller mesh size from the lower Gulf of Maine to the
Upper Bay of Fundy, and takes into consideration such variables as Corio lis
acceleration and quadratic friction terms. It is expected that if the dimensions of
the Gulf of Maine system were altered (as they would be by the construction of a
barrier for the purpose of hydroelectric power development), the tidal regime
would also be altered. The barriers would reduce the size of the GOM/BOF tidal
basin, and, therefore, the free period of the system. Since the existing free
period of the system is nearly resonant and slightly greater than the natural
oscillating period, the barriers would be expected to cause an increase in tidal
range throughout most of the system. In order to evaluate such effects,
Greenberg ran his calibrated numerical model with some modifications to
simulate the changes due to proposed barriers. His model showed an increase in
tidal range for the Maine coast of less than 10 cm for the A8 site, but increases of
2& cm and 30 em (roughly a 10% increase in tidal range) at Portland Harbor and
Boston, respectively, are expected with a barrier at the B9 site (see figure 3).27
Other tidal modellers and oceanographers have evaluated the Greenberg model
and are in general agreement with his predictions.
As the hydroelectric facility will be constructed over a period of time, this
increase is expected to occur gradually over a period of approximately five years,
although one scientist suggests that the tidal change could occur rapidly, as the
final closure is put in place.28
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As tidal range is increased, tidal currents are also expected to increase as
larger volumes of water are moved. While it is even more difficult to predict
what these increases may be, current changes might be expected to be on
approximately the same order as those for tidal range (i.e., about a 10% increase).
Sea Level Rise
These predicted changes are expected to occur within a time-frame when
the New England coast is experiencing a natural rise in sea level. Sea level data
derived from tidal records obtained over an approximately 50-year period for the
coast of Maine indicate a mean sea level rise of about 3 mm per year ,29 and it
should be kept in mind that any projections due to construction of the tidal barrier
are only valid in the long term average, as annual and monthly sea level variations
on the order of 3 cm (plus or minus) are not unusual for the New England coast.
Many scientists have predicted that in the near future, increases in sea level
rise, worldwide, should be expected due to global warming trends and thermal
expansion of the oceans.30 However, these projections are anticipated as
occurring over a much longer time frame than the one which is anticipated with
the construction of the tidal power facility.
Anticipated Effects of Tidal Regime Alterations
Concerned with the consequences that a tidal change might have on the
coastal resources of Maine, the Maine State Planning Office funded a small grant
in 1982 to researchers working at the Bigelow Laboratory for Ocean Sciences in
West Boothbay Harbor, Maine, to determine just what the effects of a 30 ern tidal
alteration might ~e to the State of Maine. Although these effects are expected to
be felt in Massachusetts and New Hampshire as well, the study was concentrated
on Maine. This study attempted to take into consideration all of the major areas
of concern, and although many of the findings were preceded by caveats
explaining the imperfect scientific knowledge involved, a number of areas were
26
addressed with some degree of certainty. A summary of the more significant
findings as discussed in the report by Larsen, et al., entitled "Preliminary
Evaluation of the Environmental Consequences of Fundy Tidal Power
Development to the Resources of the State of Maine,,,31 (hereafter referred to as
the Bigelow Report) are as follows:
Physical and Biological Consequences
1. Expansion of the intertidal area. On a slope of 10 , intertidal areas
would be expanded to the extent that a 30 cm increase in tidal range
would increase the intertidal zone by almost 18 meters and push land
borders back by approximately 9 meters. 1,700 acres of salt marsh
may be added to Maine's existing 17,000 acres, as very small slopes are
found here.
2. Restructuring of biological communities. Redistribution can be
expected as there is a change in transition between the upper and
lower salt marsh area. This may possibly cause some interference
with shorebird activities. In the short term, biological populations can
be expected to be displaced due to tidal influence as alteration does
not provide sufficient time for sedimentary processes to occur.
3. Increased area for sea ice formation. The area on which ice can form
increases with the expansion in the intertidal area. While ice provides
protection from erosion by waves in winter, during the spring, there
could be considerable erosion as blocks of Spar tina are ripped up and
rafted seaward. Rapid erosion can be expected in the short term as
the shore attempts to stabilize.
LJ. lncreased tidal prism of estuaries. This is a factor controlling the
mixing of fresh and saline waters. In large, wide-mouthed estuaries,
this effect is not expected to be significant, with the exception of
some very special cases (e.g., Merrymeeting Bay, New Hampshire, a
mostly freshwater estuary, where salt intrusion may change the
ecological balance). Small-mouthed estuaries could experience a
somewha t significant increase in flushing characteristics and, possibly,
the reduction of sedimentation rates.
5. Groundwater hydrology. There is an increased likelihood of salt water
intrusion into coastal wells. Areas that are now experiencing
difficu!ties may experience greater problems.
6. Inlet stabili ty, An increased tidal range would result in an increase in
the cross-section area of an inlet. If the inlet is natural, erosion would
proceed along its banks until an equilibrium is reached; if the inlet is
fixed by jetties, then the channel would become deeper in response to
the increased volumes of water moving through it.32
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Consequences of Higher High Tides
The Bigelow Report goes on to present some possible implications of
increasing the high tide range:
1. Landward movement of high tide line/submergence. About 4,200 acres
of land are expected to the lost in Maine in a narrow strip of land
bordering the coast.
2. Landward movement of beach profiles/erosion. No great changes are
anticipated at anyone moment, but in the long-term, an increase in
the net ra te of beach erosion might result from the new tidal range.
3. Increased penetration of storm surges and coastal flooding. The Fundy
project could increase the number of damaging storms which affect
the coast by 2.5 times. With an increase of tidal amplitude of 15 cm,
a lOO-year storm becomes what is now classified as a 300-year storm,
a 50-year storm becomes a 200-year storm, and so forth. Changes will
be determined by changes in the coastal storm surge level, assuming
the storm is coincident with at least one high tide. Low-lying areas
will be flooded more often)3
Consequences of Tidal Current Changes
The Bigelow Report addresses those changes which might be expected as a
result of tidal current changes. Basically, these can be divided into those
associated with horizontal currents and vertical currents.
Horizontal Fluxes
I. Effects of increased current on ice formation, accumulation, and
transport. Increased current could result in decreased ice formation in
channels and a longer "ice-free" season, allowing for a longer period
where boats can be used. On the negative side, there could be greater
ice movement and potential for damage from drifting chunks.
2. Reduced retention of larvae and sexual products of marine organisms.
Plankton will be more greatly dispersed, and their retention within
estuaries will be decreased. On the other hand, this may allow new
areas to be colonized.
3. Dispersal of subtidal shellfish beds. There may be a possible dispersal
of these beds so that adults may be less concentrated and therefore,
more costly to harvest.
4. Development and spreading of red tide blooms. Stronger bottom
currents wi ll tend to increase the frequency and distribution of these
toxic dinoflagellate blooms.34
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Vertical Fluxes
1. Increased mixing depths of surface waters. Greater vertical mixing in
summer could bring colder water to the surface and lower surface
water temperatures. This mixing may result in destratification, or
possibly just an increased mixing of bottom waters.
2. Altered meteorological conditions. If surface temperatures change,
corresponding changes in the atmosphere--increased fog and stronger
onshore breezes--might be expected.
3. Growth and reproduction patterns of biota would be affected by
tempera ture changes, although this will vary between species.
4. Altered fish migration patterns. For example, bluefish which enter
the northern Gulf of Maine waters sporadically when summer water
tempera tures are high may be affected by even a slight change in
temperature.
5. Altered fouling community activities. Temperature changes could
increase the abundance and rate of growth of some species such as
barnacles, while others, which can not tolerate low temperatures
(shipworms), may decrease in abundance.
6. Vertical transport of water borne substances. Dissolved substances
released to the water column will diffuse quicker.
7. The supply of nutrients to surface waters will increase, with subse-
quent effects on productivity.
8. Transport of pollutants to bottom sediments. Some pollutants will be
transported to the bottom faster. Greater dilution rates, while
considered a benefit, could be offset by quicker dispersion of pollu-
tants reaching a much greater area. Increased bottom turbulence
could maintain finer particulates, such as oil, in suspension longer than
normal)5
In summary, response of the biota to physical changes can be expected to
vary with time. Readjustment periods can be expected, but will differ between
the various species. In the short term, significant al tera tions in production,
growth, and distribution of species could be felt. In the long term, however,
biotic changes may be insignificant. Some species of marine organisms will
increase, some will decline, and others will experience no dramatic impact
whatsoever. Even subtle alterations are likely to be felt by many species,
however.
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Socio-economic Consequences
The Bigelow Report also considers a number of areas which would directly
impact on man and his use of the coastal zone.
1. Coastal structures. The long-term effects on coastal structures are
expected to be negative. Structures immediately adjacent to the
shore will be undermined. The amount and frequency of damage
during storms from flooding will be increased. For example, a 100-
year flood occurrence could become a 25-year flood occurence.
2. Federal Flood Insurance Program. Flood insurance rate maps will need
to be redone.
3. Property values. Estimates using the figures of 4,200 acres of lost
territorial land, at an average value of coastal property of $3,000/acre
would result in a loss of over $12 million. State and local governments
would lose this property tax.
4. Tourism. Maine's already limited beach belt area would be most
greatly affected. There would be a smaller sand beach area above
high tide, and the undermining of coastal sturctures could result in
increased deposition of unwanted debris on beaches. Where there are
no seawalls, the landward movement of water would proceed until a
new equilibrium is reached, then some beach areas may actually
become slightly larger. Where seawalls exist, there could be a
permanent loss of the high tide beach area. Increased fog could result
in decreased recreational beach use, with loss of revenues to Maine
from sta te-owned beaches, and similarly, losses to coastal
communities dependent on the tourist dollar. Swimmers will be faced
with strong currents, and although recreationists who sail and canoe
could be benefited by these stronger currents, they will be hampered
by the increased fog. Maneuverin,g of motorboats will be affected by
increased currents.
5. Low-lying roads will be washed out more frequently, perhaps
necessita ting their reconstruction.
6. Archaeological and historic sites. Coastal erosion is considered the
worst threat to Maine archeology currently. Some 700 coastal shell
heaps may be lost.
7. Sanitary and storm sewer outfalls. High fide may cause effJuent to
back up in sewer systems. Some of Portland's combined sewer outfalls
currently experience problems at high tide now.
8. Boat ramps may need to he rebuilt to accommodate greater tidal
ranges.
9. Shoreland access. The opportunity for greater access to a larger
intertidal area can be considered a benefit.
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10. Property boundaries. There will be a need to reconstruct municipal
property maps, or at least reassess coastal property values.
11. Search and rescue. A larger area will need to be searched as a result
of stronger currents. Fog may also hamper these efforts.
12. Pollution abatement. In the overall, the increased dispersion of
pollutants resulting from increased currents can be considered a
benefit. However, in some cases such as oil-spill containment,
increased currents will adversely affect pollution control.
13. Navigational markers, moorings, and floats. These may have to be
reloca ted, more securely moored, and may require more frequent
maintenance.
14. Nautical charts, tidal charts, and current predictions will need to be
changed.
15. Shellfishing, worm and mussel harvesting might all benefit from an
increase in new habitat areas.
16. Fin fishing. An increase in 5-10% in tidal current strength could limit
or curtail the capacity to fish, especially during spring tides, as
greater horsepower will be needed.
17. Marine transportation. Stronger currents will cause costs to go up
when operating against the currents, while conversely reducing costs
of operating with the currents. There may be problems with
maneuverability in close basins. Lower low tides will have an impact
on the accessibility to docking and mooring areas.
18. Other structures such as breakwaters and jetties will require design
modifications. Bridges and coastal railways may also require design
changes. Some underground urilltles and transmission lines may be
affected. Minor coastal facilities such as boardwalks, parks, and trails
are likely to be affected.36
Most of the socioeconomic consequences of an altered tidal range are
considered, at this point, to be costs. It is hard, if not impossible, to put a dollar
value on each of these items in any preliminary analysis and any cost/benefit
model would be subject to great criticism.
Recent History of the Fundy Project
SUbsequent to the release of the Bigelow Laboratory report, an increased
amount of public attention has been focused on the tidal power proposal. In July
of 1983, U.S. Senator George J. Mitchell (D-Maine) convened a public hearing of
the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works in Augusta, Maine, to
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take testimony on the matter)7 Subsequent to this hearing, Senator Mitchell
introduced legislation to have the Army Corps of Engineers undertake further
environmental studies of the possible United States impacts of Fundy tidal power
development. Senate Bill 1739, requests that the Secretary of the Army after
consultation with appropriate governmental agencies undertake studies to identify
potential United States impacts of Fundy tidal power development which include
determining mitigation measures, and to submit such studies to the appropriate
committees of the Congress. This bill, which also includes appropriations for a
number of large public works projects for improvements to rivers and harbors of
the United States, is currently Senate Bill 1567 and still awaits Congressional
approval.
In May of 1984, the Fundy tidal power issue was discussed at the First
Annual Bilateral Symposium on New England/Eastern Canadian Affairs held in
Providence, Rhode Island. Several events during August 1984 focused public
attention on the issue. On August 6, a major article appeared in the New York
Times on the Fundy tidal power matter;38 and, on August 25, the Annapolis Royal
prototype plant was opened and officially became the first operating tidal power
plant in North America.39
As an increasing portion of the U.S. public became aware of the possible
impacts, the state and federal governments in the United States have been drawn
to the issue. These agencies which are now involved in the matter include the
Governor's offices of the New England states and state coastal management,
fisheries and energy officials, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Fish and
Wildlife Service, NOAA, the Department of Energy, EPA, and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency.
Recently at their June 1985 meeting, the New England Governors and
Eastern Canadian Premiers resolved to bring the issue before the Secretary of
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State and Minister of External Affairs for possible reference to the International ,
Joint Commission.40
In light of what the author and others therefore perceive as the potential for
some significant environmental consequences and potential conflicts, it is
important to examine the proposed Fundy project from a legal viewpoint. The
following chapter examines the issue of transboundary environmental impacts in
the international law framework.
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CHAPTER III
INTERNATIONAL LAW RELEVANT TO THE PROPOSED PROJECT
Defining Transboundary Degrada tion or Pollution
A key assumption of this thesis is that these projected tidal effects or at
least some of them can be considered a form of transboundary environmental
degradation or "pollution." Assuming this to be the case, the viability of the
Minas Basin endeavor should be viewed in part with respect to current
international and domestic laws which address transboundary environmental
impacts. While the concept of enhanced energy (i.e ., increased tidal currents and
range) inputs may not appear to fit the classic definition of what most people
perceive as "pollution", per se, there is some evidence to suggest that in evolving
law, at least in an international sense, these forms of energy as opposed to those
energy inputs more traditionally accepted (e.g., heat from cooling plants) may
indeed qualify as a form of environmental degredation or poilution, 'assuming
there are deleterious effects associated with them.
The term "pollution" has been defined in many ways, ranging from Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary (1979) definition as the "emission of semen at times
other than coitus" to those that historically have come to define the word in
environmental terms. While early definitions used some measures of chemical
contamination to define what was meant by pollution of the environment, the past
two decades have seen an expansion of this definition to include any changets)
which might adversely alter the environment. Champ, in writing on the
etymology of "pollution" in a recent article states that "the variety of usage is
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derived from the perspectives of (1) chemists: presence of contaminants, (2)
biologists and ecologists: effects on organisms and on ecosystems, and (3) policy
or decision makers: impai~ment of water use or benefit (resource value).'d
These more broad-based definitions have been incorporated by a number of
national and international scientific forums. Domestically, the United States
President's Science Advisory Committee (1965) defined pollution as:
the unfavorable alteration of our surroundings wholly or largely as a by-
product of man's actions, through direct or indirect effects of changes in
energy patterns, radiation levels, chemical and physical constitution, and
abundances of organisms. These changes may affect man directly, or
through his supplies of water and of agricultural and other biological
products, his physical objects or possessions or his opportunities for
recrea tlon and appreciation of na ture.2
Similarly, the United States Congress (1978) broadly defined ocean pollution as
"any short-term or long-term change in the marine envlronrnent.v-
On an international basis, the most commonly recognized and widely
accepted definition of pollution was formulated by the International
Oceanographic Commission's (IOC) Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of
Marine Pollution (GESAMP) (1980), and has been incorporated into the Convention
on the Law of the Sea.4 This definition as found at 4 in Part I, Article I of that
treaty states that pollution of the marine environment means:
The introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into
the marine environment (including estuaries) which results or is likely to
result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources, hazards to
human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other
legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and
reduction of amenltles.P
In conclusion, Champ states that "the scientific use of the term "pollution"
[environmental degradation] appears to be losing ground to social and political
connotations and, its environmental connotation is relative to social and political
values and, •••economic conditions of a given period."6 A discussion of how
transboundary damage is viewed in international law in light of this expanding
definition of what constitutes "pollution" follows.
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International Law and Transboundary Pollution
I~ternational law is defined as "a body of principles, customs, and rules that
are recognized as effectively binding obligations by sovereign states and other
interna tional persons in their mutual rela tions.1I7 Basically, all states are
considered equals in the international legal system and no single source of law is
considered to be the central law-making authority. Rather, international law is
derived from several sources such as treaties or conventions and other specific
agreements between states. Custom is another source of international law; where
states repeatedly behave in a particular manner under the belief that they are
obligated to do so, after a period of time that pattern of practice becomes a rule
of customary law.
Interna tional environmental law, and in particular, as it concerns
transboundary environmental damage, is largely a creation of the twentieth
century. Both treaty law and customary law have been used to derive the basis by
which transboundary pollution cases have been examined in the courts (and by
academia), and Canada and the United States have provided much of the
substance by which the current law is now based. On the whole, customary law
serves as the more-widely cited basis for establishing the principles of
international law with respect to the environment, as there is little general treaty
law that has been established on the subject. Although there are a few bi- and-
multi-lateral treaties which both the United States and Canada are party to, in
addition to a number of other international environmental treaties which neither
are party to, the .rule s by which international environmental disputes should be
settled remain largely nebulous due to a reticent attitude on the part of states to
overstep their political boundaries and question the sovereignty of another state.
Yet, the responsibility of sta tes with regards to transboundary environ mental
damage has been outlined in general and while the development of international
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environmental law continues to evolve to reflect man's new incursions on his
environment, there is an increasing realization on the part of many that
protection of the global environment will require a unified effort. A review of
the evolution of transboundary environmental law follows.
The Trail Smelter Case
The authoritative statement of a state's obligation to prevent transboundary
pollution damage to neighboring states is the 1941 arbitral decision in the Trail
Smelter Case,S the outcome of an environmental dispute between the United
States and Canada. The dispute centered on the release of sulphur dioxide into
the air as a by-product of the smelting process from the operation of a smelter
operated by the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of Canada Ltd., a
private corporation located in Trail, British Columbia, eleven miles north of the
United States-Canada International boundary. The polluted air drifted across the
border, causing damage in the State of Washington between 1925 and 1938,
claimed at that time to be in excess of two million dollars. It was initially
believed that the damage was limited to several hundred farmers and woodlot
owners, but subsequently it was revealed that livestock were also damaged as was
property in the Town of Northport, Washington and several business enterprises.9
In 1925, the first formal complaint was made to the Smelting Company by a
United States farmer whose land was located just south of the international
boundary. Upon investigation, the company acknowledged that damage had been
and was being done, and they began to negotiate with .those who had complained
and expressed a ,desire to reach a settlement. Several different claims for
different amounts were settled during the following two years. In June 1928, the
County Commissioners of Stevens County, Washington adopted a resolution aimed
at blocking any further payments by the Smelting Company, pending a long-term
solution. Subsequently, the Stevens County farmers proposed a private suit
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against the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company in Canada for injunctive
relief and damages but was discouraged by an 1893 ruling by the English House of
Lords that would have compelled British Columbia courts to refuse jurisdiction in
suits based on damage outside the province.I 0 While the Canadian company
would have opted to obtain an easement over the farmers' and woodlot owners'
property, the Washington State Constitution prohibited non-citizens from owning
property rights in Washington. Therefore, the United States Federal Government
formally took up the claims of Washingtonians against the Canadian Government,
and, in effect, bypassed the Smelting Company.
In December 1927, the United States had requested that the dispute be
referred to an international joint commission formed under the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909 between the United States and Canada (and explored in depth later
in this thesis). So done, the Commission was asked to assess the extent to which
property in the State of Washington had been damaged by fumes emanating from
the Trail Smelter, and to state the amount of indemnity needed to compensate for
past damages. The Commission determined this sum to be $350,000 through the
first of January, 1932, exclusive of subsequent damage.! 1
Two years later, dissatisfied with the existing conditions of the smelter
operation and aware of continuing injury to property in Washington, the United
States renewed diplomatic negotiations with Canada. In these negotiations, the
United States persuaded Canada to sign a convention establishing an arbitral
tribunal to deal with the issues of compensa tion and to decide the issue of
injunctive relief• . After its own three year investigation of the behavior of the
smoke cloud from the smelter stacks, combined with the study which had already
been performed by the International Joint Commission, the tribunal made its
decision. Damages were awarded to the United States and controls were placed
on the emission of sulphur dioxide fumes from the smelter to "remove the causes
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of present controversy" and "prevent any damage of a material nature occurring
in the State of Washington in the future" from occurring)2 In the Trail Smelter
Case, the tribunal issued the following interpretation which has since become the
standard for transboundary environmental damage decisions:
Under the principles of international law, as well as the law of the United
States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of territory in such a
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the
properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequences and
the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence. 13
More than fifty years later, the Trail Smelter decision, the only
international arbitral decision directly concerning transboundary pollution, serves
as the principal guideline for other international environmental disputes.
The Corfu Channel Case
The Corfu Channel Case 14 is often cited in support of international
environmental rulings, although it did not involve any pollution incident directly.
In this 1949 International Court of Justice case, Great Britain sought
compensation from Albania for injuries arising from the destruction by mines of
two ships in Albanian territorial waters. After determining that the mining could
not have taken place without" the knowledge of Albanian authorities, the Court
held Albania liable to Great Britain for damages to her ships and injuries and
death to her seamen. (Albania ignored the award of compensation and has refused
to pay Great Britain.) The decision was based on "every State's obligation not to
allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
States,,15 and thus lends support to the principle that a State is obligated to limit
its actions to the ,extent necessary to protect other states' rights. Subsequently,
this argument has been extended to other transboundary pollution damage cases.
The Stockholm Conference
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in
Stockholm, Sweden in 1972, hereafter referred to as the Stockholm Conference,
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was the first major multinational attempt to define the duties of states' with
regards to transfrontier environmental damage. At the Stockholm Conference, a
set of 26 principles were drafted in a declara tion to "inspire and guide the peoples
of the world in the preservation and enhancement of the human environment.,,16
Although the basis for these principles evolved over a long period of time prior to
the Stockholm Conference, the Declaration was the first attempt to explicitly
spell out what the responsibilities of states were with regards to the global
environment. Based largely on previously well-established principles of
international law such as national sovereignty and international cooperation as
embodied in the United Nations Charter, the Stockholm Declaration is not a
convention and is therefore not directly binding on any state. The primary
principles relevant to the subject of transboundary pollution and which have been
since embodied in many agreements since their formulation are Principles 21 and
22. Principle 21 states that:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do
not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction)7 .
Furthermore, Principle 22 reinforces Principle 21, requesting that:
States shall co-operate to develop further the international law regarding
liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other
environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control
of such States to areas beyond their jUrisdiction)8
Acceptance of these two principles involved substantial debate over a
number of issues for the roughly two year period prior to the Stockholm
Conference at which they were adopted. The central dispute in regard to
Principle 21 concerned the extent to which state sovereignty was subject to
limitations of some sort, although all states attending the Conference agreed that
the exercise of that sovereignty was subject to the obligation to avoid harmful
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effects to other states) 9 Principle 22 was controversial because it could be
interpreted as an endorsement of a principle of absolute liability, rather than
basing liability on a state's negligence.
After the Stockholm Conference had adjourned, representatives from the
Canadian and United States governments met to discuss protection of boundary
coastal areas from environmental degradation. As a result of their meeting, both
countries jointly issued a statement supporting the Stockholm Declaration and
recognizing it as the basis for "the development of law and procedures for
settlement of disputes of an environmental nature."20
Other Customary Law Supporting the Obligation of States as
Pertains the Transboundary Environment
There are other examples of state practice that indicate that the Principles
concerning transboundary pollution damage which were put forth in the Stockholm
Declaration have found widespread acceptance. These include General Assembly
resolutions, recommendations of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development, and the writings of the International Law Association. Each is
briefly discussed below.
United Nations General Assembly Resolutions
Shortly after the Stockholm Conference, the United Nations Assembly
adopted Resolution 2996 (XXVII) in support of the obligation of states to prevent
the occurrence of transboundary pollution. Although again not binding,
resolutions often serve an important role in the process.of formation of customary
law. Resolution ,2996 recognizes that Principles 21 and 22 of the Stockholm
Declaration "lay down the basic rules governing this matter [transboundary
pollution damage and the responsibility of states] ".21 This resolution was
adopted by a recorded vote of 112 in favor to none against, with ten
abstentions.22
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In 1974, the General Assembly adopted the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States in Resolution 3281 (XXIX). Article 30 of that Charter states:
the protection, preservation and enhancement of the environment for the
present and future generations is the responsibility of all states•••All states
have the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. All States shall co-operate in
evolving international norms and regulations in the field of the
environment.23
In this Resolution, the statements on state sovereignty, although adopted
from the language of Principles 21 and 22 of the Stockholm Declaration appear to
have been dee mphasized in favor of those that recognize the broader state
obligation to protect the environment despite earlier articles of the Charter
which emphasize the sovereignty of states to determine their own resource
policies.
OECD Recommendations
The principles set forth in the Stockholm Declaration have also been
espoused by bodies outside the United Nations. Evidence for this can be found in
the Guiding Principles on Transfrontier Pollution adopted by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1974 and many other
subsequent OECD documents.
The OECD was set up under a Convention in December 1960 to promote
policies designed to:
o achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and
a rising standard of living in Member countrles, while maintaining
financial stability, and thus to contribute to , the development of the
world economy;
o contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-
member countries in the process of economic development; and
o contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-
discriminatory .~asi s in accordance with international obligations.24
The twenty-four Member nations of the OECD include Canada and the
United States. The Council of the OECD is not empowered to create obligations
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on the part of its members, but instead have made a number of recommendations
in the form of principles which OECD members "should" follow. The Guiding
Principles on Transfrontier Pollution followed the adoption of an earlier oECD
principle known as the "polluter-pays-principle" which generally recognized that
responsiblity for the costs of pollution abatement should be born by the polluter.
Within these Guiding Principles, Title B-International Solidarity, presents the
primary statement of obligation on the part of the state:
Without prejudice to their rights and obligations under international law and
in accordance with their responsibility under Principle 21 of the Stockholm
Declaration, countries should seek, as far as possible, an equitable balance
of their rights and obligations as regards the zones concerned by
transboundary pollution.25
The Principles go on to ask members to define a long-term policy for the
protection and improvement of the environment in these transboundary zones and
to coordinate these policies between States as far as possible.
Here, again, the customary law aspect is reinforced by reference to the
State's "responsibility under Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration." Other
provisions of the OECD Guiding Principles go beyond the Stockholm Declaration
Principles in attempting to regulate "pollution" by requiring a balancing of
interests of the acting and affected States of any substance that would "impair or
interfere" with other uses of the environment.
ILA Writings
Recently, the International Law Association (ILA), a non-govern mental
international organization, has continued to support the,trend of customary law as
regards transfron:ier pollution. .At their 1982 Conference in Montreal, the ILA
attempted to codify as a body of principles the substantive and procedural rules of
relevant customary law by adopting the "Rules of International Law on
Transfrontier Pollution."26 Articles 3 and 4 define the obligations of states with
regard to existing and potential transboundary pollution.
46
Article 3 (Abatement)
(1)
(2)
States are under an obligation to abate existing transboundary
pollution to such an extent that no substantial damage is caused in the
territory of another State.
States should endeavor to further reduce existing transboundary
pollution to the lowest level that may be reached by the application of
the most advanced technology available to them)7
Article 4 (New or increased transfrontier Pollution)
States are under an obligation to limit new or increased transfrontier
pollution at the lowest level that may be reached by the application of the
most advanced technology available to them.28
In these writings, the ILA rules extend the Trail Smelter decision by
incorporating the substantial damage concept in Article 3, but then goes on to
impose a stricter obligation in Article 4 by addressing pollution which has not yet
occurred. Also incorporated is the concept of using the best available technology
to prevent such damage. Thus, these articles appear to go beyond existing
customary law, but reflect the rapidly changing pace with which we must view our
increasing and new threats to the environment.
Treaty Law
In addition to the substantive obligations imposed by customary and
Conventional or Treaty law, the latter often also places procedural obligations on
states which are intended to be binding. Procedural obligations in the case of
potential transboundary damage-causing projects would include those obligations
to notify potentially affected states and to consult and negotiate with them with
a view to modifying the damaging aspects of the projects.
The United States and Canada are both party to bilateral and multilateral
treaties and agreements which would place considerable obligations on them with
respect to the area of international law and transboundary pollution. These
agreements include:
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• the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 between Canada and the United
States29 (which because of its significance in United States-Canadian
disputes is discussed in a later chapter);
the 1954 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Seas by
Oil,30 and numerous other oil pollution agreements, including a 1978
protocol on marine pollution and a bilateral agreement on oil spill
•
contingency plans;
the London Dumping Convention of 197231;
• the Convention on Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques32; the Convention on Long Distance Transfrontier Air
Pollution33; and, an August 1980 Canadian-U.S. memorandum of intent
on transboundary air pollution, and several other treaties on certain
shared water basins.
Two of these are mentioned briefly in the following discussion. In addition,
the Law of the Sea Treaty34, which of the two countries only Canada has ratified,
and the Nordic Convention35 are discussed herein because of relevant provisions
which reflect the direction in which the evolving law of transboundary pollution is
moving.
The Law of the Sea Treaty
The recently-concluded Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS Ill) adopted by a wide margin a Convention on the Law of the Sea
which attempts to define and regulate the large majority of ocean uses. Although
the United States has not signed the Law of the Sea Convention primarily because
<
of its deep seabed mining provisions Canada has signed the Law of the Sea Treaty.
During the many years in which the Law of the Sea Treaty was being formulated,
both Canada and the United Sta tes supported the inclusion of articles concerning
marine pollution and the responsibility of states with respect to causing it.
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Relevant provisions in the Law of the Sea Convention are found in Part XII
which deals with the preservation of the marine environment and contains a
number of articles which are relevant to the transboundary pollution issue and
which echo the principles established in the Stockholm Conference. Specifically,
Article 193 notes that "States have the sovereign right to exploit their natural
resources pursuant to their environmental policies and in accordance with their
duty to protect and preserve the marine environment.36
Article 194 at paragraph (2) goes on to request that:
States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their
jurisdiction and control are so conducted as not to cause damage by
pollution to other States and their environment, and that pollution arising
from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control does not
spread beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance
with this Convention.3?
Whether or not such a large endeavor as the Law of the Sea Treaty with all
its many provisions can ever expect to be enforced, it is interesting to note that
the above articles of that treaty appear to be the first time that the Principles
set forth in the Stockholm Declaration have been imposed on the world
community in a binding fashion.
Article 235 in Section 9 01 Part XII spells out the responsibility and liability
provislonse
(I) States are responsible for the fulfil men t of their in terna tional obligations
concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment.
They shall be liable in accordance with international law;
(3) •••With the objective of assuring prompt and adequa te compensation in the
respect of all damage caused by pollution of the marine environment, States
shall co-operate in the implementation of existing international law and the
further development of international law relating to responsibility and
liability for the assessment of and compensation for damage and the
settlement of related disputes, as well as, where appropriate, development
of criteria and procedures for payment of adequate compensation, such as
compulsory insurance or compensation funds)8
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The Obligation of Prior Consultation
The procedural obligation of prior consul ta tion or obligation to notify is
increasingly becoming an important facet of transboundary pollution law. This
obligation includes a commitment to respond to requests for information which
may be construed as recognizing an obligation to perform joint studies or to
submit the matter to an outside body or third party for study. The discussion on
joint study commissions and third party involvement will be examined in a
subsequent section on the application of dispute settlement; however, it is
instructive here to point to a few examples of the growing awareness of this
important facet of evolving transboundary pollution law.
During the drafting of Principles 21 and 22 of the Stockholm Declaration,
another closely related principle, "Principle 20" was proposed.
Relevant information must be supplied by States on activities or
developments within their jurisdiction or under their control whenever they
believe, or have reason to believe, that such information is needed to avoid
risk of significant adverse effects on the environment in areas beyond their
na tional jurisdiction.39
This principle was hotly debated due to an ongoing dispute between
Argentina and Brazil and was not adopted, but rather referred to the General
Assembly for consideration.
As a matter of reference it is interesting to note here that the United
States and Canadian proposed texts for Principle 20 varied significantly as regards
the obligation of prior notification and consultation.
recommendation was that:
The United States
Whenever a proposed activity by any State might cause grave harm to
human environment beyond its territory the State or States planning such an
activity should undertake appropriate consultations before proceeding with
any such activity.40
The Canadian position indicated that it considered that a lesser degree of
potential danger triggered the obligation and was thus worded more strongly.
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Every State has a duty to consult with other States before under~ak.ing
activities which may damage the environment of such State~, a~d a .sImIlar
duty to consult with the appropriate international org~nizatlOn,.If any,
before undertaking activities which may damage the env ironrnent In areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.41
The outcome of these debates over Principle 20 were eventually
incorporated in General Assembly Resolution 2995 (XXVII).
The General Assembly,
Having considered principle 20 as contained in the draft text of a preamble
and principles of the declaration on the human environment, referred to it
for consideration by the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment,
Recalling its resolution 2849 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971 entitled
"Development and Environment,"
Bearing in mind that, in exercising their sovereignty over their natural
resources, States must seek, through effective bilateral and multilateral co-
opera tion or through regional machinery, to preserve and improve the
environment,
1. Emphasizes that, in the exploration, exploitation and development of
their natural resources, States must not produce significant harmful effects
in zones situated outside their national jurisdiction;
2. Recognizes that co-operation between States in the field of the
environment, including co-operation towards the implementation of
principles 21 and 22 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment, will be effectively achieved if official and public
knowledge is provided of the technical data relating to the work to be
carried out by States within their national jurisdiction, with a view to
avoiding significant harm that may occur in the environment of the adjacent
area;
3. Further recognizes that the technical data referred to in paragraph 2
above will be given and received in the best spirit of co-operation and good-
neighbourliness, without this being construed as enabling each State to delay
or impede the programmes and projects of exploration, exploitation and
development of the natural resources of the States in whose territories such
programmes and projects are carried out.42
Under resolution 2995 on coopera tion between States on the human
environment, the, General Assembly of the U.N. emphasized that, in the
exploration, exploitation, and development of their natural resources, States must
not produce significant harmful effects in zones situated outside their national
jurisdiction. While the General Assembly did not define what they construed as
significant harm, they recognized that co-operation between States in that field
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would be effectively achieved if States were to provide knowledge of technical
data for the work to be carried out by other States to avoid harm which might
occur in the human environment of the adjacent area. The resolution was adopted
by 115 votes to none, with ten abstentions.43
The obligation of prior notification receives further support in two treaties
which reflect the direction that transboundary environmental law is heading.
The Nordic Convention
Perhaps the most definitive attempt at a multinational agreement which
deals with transfrontier pollution is the Nordic Convention on the Protection of
the Environment to which Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Norway are party.
This Convention provides for many types of environmental problems, including,
but not limited to, problems relating to water, sand drift, air pollution, noise,
light, and changes in temperature (many of which may be appropriate to the
Fundy tidal project consequences). In the Nordic Convention, a regime has been
created which internationalizes environmental control and pollution abatement
measures between the participating nations and seeks consultation prior to
undertaking a potentially harmful transboundary activity. Article 11 of that
Convention provides that:
Where the permissibility of environmentally harmful activities which entail
or may entail considerable nuisance in another contracting State is being
examined by the Government or by the appropriate Minister or Ministry of
the State in which the activities are being carried out, consultations shall
take place between the States concerned if the Government of the former
State so requests.44
Furthermore, the Nordic Convention offers the possibility for indiv iduals
who are affected 'or may be affected by a nuisance caused by environmentally
harmful activities in another state to bring the question of permissibility of such
activities to court in the offending state. Through certain provisions of the
Nordic Convention, compensation is based on rules no less favorable than the rules
of the offending state. The Nordic Convention, therefore, allows for far-reaching
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jurisdictions and authority by allowing resort to both public and private
resolutions.
The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
A consultation provision similar to that found in the Nordic Convention is
found in the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution in its
Article 5 which provides that:
Consultations shall be held, upon request, at an early stage between, on the
one hand, Contracting Parties which are actually affected by or exposed to
a significant risk of long-range transboundary air pollution and, on the other
hand, Contracting Parties within which and subject to whose jurisdiction a
significant contribution to long-range transboundary air pollution originates,
or could originate, in connection with activities carried on or completed
therein.45
Both the United States and Canada are parties to this Convention which was
entered into force in March of 1983.
A framework enumerating the basic responsibilities of States towards
protection of the transboundary environment has been established in customary
law. However, substantially less law aimed at protection of the transboundary
environment has been codified in treaties. While the international community,
recognizes the right of States to do what they want with their resources, these
States are not allowed to exploit those resources in such a manner as to cause
damage to their neighbors. Furthermore, there is a an increasing amount of
customary law and, to some extent, conventional law, which indicates that if
there is a chance tha t internal exploi ta tion of resources may ca use transboundary
damage, there is an obligation to inform the potential recipient of this damage of
the consequences and to work towards elimination or mitigation of the potential
damage.
Given this background on how transboundary damage is viewed in
international law, it is now 'use fu1 to examine the domestic legislation in Canada
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and the United States which does or does not provide for consideration of
transboundary impacts.
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CHAPTER IV
DOMESTIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA RELEVANT TO THE
PROPOSED PROJECT
Analysis of existing domestic environmental laws within the United States
and Canada reveal that they are not adequate in protecting the environment
across their borders. In part, this can be blamed on the federal systems under
which each nation operates and in part on the recognized principle of sovereignty
which inhibits adequate consultation with neighboring countries by not providing
rules and standards for addressing it and the fear of overstepping political
boundaries. The following sections discuss the environmental framework and
relevant laws in each country which attempt to address transboundary pollution,
including those laws associated with the import of electricity to the United States
from Canada, and also examines some state and provincial legislation which might
be relevant to the proposed Fundy project.
United States Environmental Legislation pertaining to Transboundary Pollution
In 1969, the United States Congress enacted the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).! The purposes of this Act include:
. To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable
harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent
or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health
and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and
natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on
Environmental Quality.2
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the lead federal agency
responsible for protection and control of pollution of the environment in the
United States. EPA was established in the Executive branch of the Federal
government as an independent agency in 1970 to permit coordinated and effective
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governmental action on behalf of the environment. Among its many duties, EPA
is responsible for reinforcing efforts of other Federal agencies with respect to the
impact of their operations on the environment, and is specifically charged with
publishing its determinations when those determinations hold that a proposal is
unsatisfactory from the standpoint of public health, welfare, or environmental
quality.
Section 102 of NEPA requires Federal agencies in the United States to
prepare detailed reports (environmental impact statements) on the environmental
effects of proposed major actions. However, there is nothing in this section to
indicate that actions having international ramifications are to be treated any
differently then others subject to the EIS requirement. The only recognition of
the international environmental situation is found at 102(F) which recognizes that
environmental problems can transcend national boundaries and requests that all
Federal agencies:
•••recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental
problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States,
lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to
maximize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline
in the quali ty of mankind's world environment)
NEPA as originally written makes little other reference to acknowledging
other nations and it has been largely felt within the foreign service community
that any incursion into trying to regulate activities through the EIS process could
interfere with foreign policy objectives.
Executive Order 12114
In order to address these concerns, and, at the same time meet the
objectives of NEPA, a program was designed by the various federal agencies with
international responsibilities and the Council on Environmental Quality. This
program culminated in President Carter's approval of Executive Order No. 12114
of January 4, 1979,4 which although not formerly based on NEPA, is designed to
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further the purposes of the Act. Structured to insure that federal decision makers
are informed of pertinent environmental considerations of actions having effects
outside the geographical boundaries of the United States, Executive Order No.
12114 asks that such considerations be taken into account when decisions are
made. The Order cites the circumstances under which its requirements are
applicable and also specifies procedures that must be followed. Affected agencies
are further required to develop their own implementing procedures.
Prior to the signing of Executive Order 12114, federal agencies had
frequently disagreed on the extraterritorial reach of NEPA's EIS requirement.
Agencies such as the Departments of Commerce, State, Defense and Treasury,
along with the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) opposed the extension of the
environmental impact procedure. At the same time, the Agency for International
Development (AID) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
espoused the requirement.5
From review of the Order, it is unclear as to which category a tidal power
project with extraterritorial environmental impacts would be considered under,
assuming it was at all. For purposes of this discussion, Section 2-3(a) of the Order
might be the most applicable to the proposed development as it considers "major
Federal actions significantly affecting the environment of the global commons
outside the jurisdiction of any nation (e.g., the oceans or Antarctica)."6 Under
this classification (which assumes ocean waters not under U.S. or Canadian
jurisdiction, Le., somewhere between each nation's EEf:s are subject to impacts),
an environmental, impact statement would have to be prepared, although it is up
~o the discretion of the initiating agency to determine the scope of this review.
Another classification the project might be considered under is where the United
States was completely responsible for the project, where it might be classified as
an action under Section 2-3(b), "major Federal actions significantly affecting the
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environment of a foreign nation not participating with the United States and not
otherwise involved in the action",? and would therefore require other types of
environmental studies, assessments, and/or reviews, which may, but not
necessarily, include input from the affected nation.
While specific types of actions such as intelligence activities, arms
transfers, and disaster and emergency relief action have been exempted from the
requirements of Executive Order 12114 to mimimize bureaucracy, other projects
with transboundary environmental effects may be excluded from study also. At
least one provision of the Order appears to contradict the other provisions found
in Section 2-3 and does not at all further the purpose of protecting the
environment. Section 3-5 of the Order dealing with multiple impacts states that:
if a major Federal action having effects on the environment of the United
States or the global commons requires preparation of an environmental
impact statement, and if the action also has effects on the environment of a
foreign nation, an environmental impact statement need not be prepared
with respect to the effects on the environment of the foreign nation.8
Thus, the necessity for and type of environmental impact documentation to
be used in reviewing each project appears to be highly ambiguous. At least from
one perspective, it appears that were the United States to perform an EIS on the
effects outside its EEZ, which would perhaps consider some minor tidal changes,
there is no reason why it would even have to consider the impacts on the coastal
environment of the adjacent nation. Therefore, we find that the Order has had
little real effect since its issuance. Three reasons for this are:
1) excepted actions far outnumber the action to which the Order's
requirements are ~pplicable;
2) even those agency actions to which the Order does apply are not judicially
reviewable. It allows agencies to use discretion in choosing to review an action,
determining the scope of review, deciding which procedures to use, and providing
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for the availability of a completed document. It bars all private enforcement of
extraterritorial review requirements.
3) the Reagan Administration has demonstrated very little interest in
enforcing its provisions.
Many scholars and legal practioners have criticized Executive Order 12114
as being weak. Francis M. Allegra, in the Cleveland State Law Review, states
that the Executive Order does not further the purposes of NEPA because it does
not strike a proper balance between foreign and environmental policy
considera tions, "The excessive allocation of administra tive discretion overpowers
any environmental review requirements and has created a procedure which is so
flexible that it is merely suggestlve.t' ' Commenting on the disproportionate
emphasis on the protection of foreign policy Allegra makes the valid point that
"the government's basic premise seems to be that environmental review interferes
with foreign nations' internal affairs. However, quite the opposite can be true.
By failing to take adequate environmental precautions, the United States may
cause an extreme disruption in the environment of another country. This clearly
affects another na tion's internal affairs." 10
Glenn Pincus, in the Buffalo Law Review noted however, that in fact, past
experience had indicated that undertaking impact assessment of projects in
foreign nations had been a positive experience.
We have discovered that developing countries themselves have come
increasingly -to recognize the inter related nature of environment and
development and to seek to ensure that environmental considerations are
adequately addressed in development projects. Further, the practical experience
of A.I.D. has been that it is possible to undertake detailed environmental analyses
of U.S.-supported 'projects abroad and that the results obtained are useful to us, as
well as to host country planners, in making project declsions.U
Allegra further points out that for NEPA to be properly extended
extraterritorily, the Council on Environmental Quality would have to oversee the
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agencies' implementat ion of NEPA foreign regulations, which, given their ties
with the Executive branch is unlikely.
Canadian Domestic Environmental Legislation
Whereas domestic legislation in the United States therefore appears weak
and incapable of providing for review of the extra territorial effects of such a
project as the proposed Canadian Fundy tidal project, Canadian law appears even
weaker as no consideration is provided for extraterritorial environmental impacts
under existing Canadian law.
As one author writes,
These border environmental issues are complica ted by the fact that, on the
whole, environmental constraints are less stringent in Canada than in the
U.S. Larger and less crowded than the U.S., with higher unemployment and
more dependent on resource development, Canada has attributed less
priority to ecological protection and more to resource production•••12
The author goes on to point out that:
Not only are Canadian federal environmental policies less demanding, but
standards actually enforced vary more from province to province than from
state to state. Furthermore, U.S. environmentalists are more able than
Canadians to bring resource industries before courts; this often leads to
costly extended litigation, greater risks and uncertainties, and sometimes
defea t for producers. 13
NEPA is the pattern for the Canadian Federal Environmental Assessment
and Review Process (EARP)14 established by Cabinet decision in December 1973
and later amended in February 1977. EARP is a three stage approach to
environmental impact analysis and is designed to provide a means of determining
in advance the potential environmental impact of all federal projects, programs
and activities. The ultimate responsiblility for decisions resulting from EARP
activities rests with the Minister of the Environment and his Cabinet colleagues.
The Minister of the Environment's role is further supported in the
Government Organization Act of 1979 which states that the Minister
shall initiate, recommend and undertake programs and coordinate programs
of the Government of Canada, that are designed••••to ensure that new
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federal projects, programs and activities that are found to have prpbable
significant adverse effects, and results thereof taken into account •••.l 5
A major weakness in EARP as it relates to the proposed Fundy Project is
that while all federal departments and agencies are bound by the Process,
proprietary Crown Corporations (such as the Tidal Power Corporation) and federal
regulatory agencies are invited rather than mandated to participate in the
Process.
Federal projects are considered to be those ini tia ted by federal departments
and agencies, those for which federal funds are solicited and those involving
federal property. Therefore, projects originating outside the federal government
which involve a particular federal department through funding or property
considera tions, would be included in the EARP.
EARP
Three sequential review stages are involved in EARP, although not every
stage necessarily occurs in the examination of every project. The first two stages
involve self-assessment by the federal agency initiating the project, and the third
step is a more formal review of projects, considered, on the basis of departmental
self assessment, .tp have porenrlally significant environmental impacts. The
Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office (FEARO) is: (1) responsible for
the establishment of Environmental Assessment Panels to review referred
projects and (2) is required to respond directly to the Minister of the Environment.
In certain cases, an Environmental Review Board, external to the federal public
service, may be established to conduct the formal review,
The EARP automatically begins when a project is conceived and is largely
based on self-assessment by the federal departments and agencies initiating the
project. These entities are then responsible for both the initial assessment and
for establishing the significance of environmental impacts. The latter is largely a
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subjective determination and may rely heavily on public reaction solicited during
the assessment phase.
Assuming the agency or department concludes that the nature and scope of
potential environmental effects cannot be determined readily by this procedure,
as may be the case with the proposed Fundy project, the proposal is subjected to a
more detailed examination, known as an Initial Environmental Evaluation (lEE).
The lEE normally includes a description of the project, a description of the
current environment and resource use, an outline of the potential environmental
effects and impacts and the details of the measures proposed to mitigate or
prevent anticipated environmental effects. Additionally, it provides a judgement
on the impact of the effects which remain after all known measures for
prevention and mitigation have been specified. An important part of the lEE is
also the examination of alternative ways of accomplishing the project and the
identification of the preferred alternatives. If, upon completion of the lEE, the
environmental effects of the project are deemed to be significant, the project is
referred to the Minister of the Environment for a formal review under EARP.
The formal review includes the formation of an Environmental Assessment
Panel, the formulation of guidelines for preparation of the Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS), preparation of the EIS, and implementation of an extensive
public information program. Following a period of public and technical reviews of
the impact statement, panel deliberations are held to formulate recommendations
to the Minister of the Environment. The Panel can recommend that a project not
proceed; that it proceed as proposed; or that it proceed with modifications, or in
accordance with specific conditions.
Decisions on the Panel's recommendations are made by the Minister of the
Environment and the Minister of the initiating or sponsoring department. Upon
agreement to accept the recommendations, the appropriate departments or
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agencies are instructed to implement them. Should the two Ministers disagree,
the matter would probably be referred to the federal Cabinet for resolution.
In the case of proposed federal projects with important envirommental
implications for provincial governments, a cooperative approach to environmental
assessment is encouraged. Joint federal-provincial panels or provincial
representation on the federal Environmental Assessment Panels are methods to
achieve this coopera tion,
In summary, Canadian federal environmental legislation does not mandate
the Tidal Power Corporation to undertake environmental assessment, although
there is every indication that the Corporation would submit to it. In fact, the
Tidal Power Corporation contracted for some of the early studies that suggested
adverse impacts from the proposed facility, and has on numerous occasions given
broad assurances that it will submit to a full environmental review under EARP.
Comparison Between the Domestic Legislations
of Canada and the United States
The primary difference between the two domestic legislations is that the
United States environmental impact assessment is based on statute, whereas in
Canada it is a matter of Cabinet directive and is not statutory. The question
remains however as to whether the Canadian environment review process would
include adequate review of transboundary impacts.
There are only a few examples of the environmental assessment review
process which address the area of transboundary concern. One project includes
the guidelines that were prepared for the EARP for a Canadian Beaufort Sea
hydrocarbon production proposal.Iv The Beaufort Sea is an area off the northern
coast of Alaska and northwestern Canada which is divided by the international
boundary <still in dispute) between the United States and Canada. While these
guidelines provided for consideration of potential significant environmental
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effects in the coastal waters of Alaska, it noted that possible effects in this area
can not be examined by the review panel to the same degree of detail as those
impacts occurring inside Canadian jurisdiction. Although Alaskans were invited to
attend several public hearings on the hydrocarbon development proposals, these
hearings were held in Canada only and there was little input by potentially-
affected individuals in the United States as a result)7 This gives some indication
that EARP may have some inherent limitations when it comes to transboundary
considerations. Furthermore, the quality of the EARP cannot be tested in the
courts as is possible under United States environmental assessment review.
Provincial Environ mental Legislation
Provincial environmental legislation in Canada, for the most part, is even
weaker than the federal environmental legislation.
Other than Ontario, Quebec, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Newfoundland, all
other provinces' existing environmental impact policies are wholly
dependent upon discretionary administrative and executive decisions of the
respective Cabinets, which often result in an overemphasis on political
realities (particularly energy related decisions»)8
Nova Scotia has a poor record environmentally. As one critic writes, "Nova
Scotia has no environmental impact assessment legislation or pro cess, but does on
occasion examine many large, potentially environmentally significant projects
under the Environmental Protection Act of 1973.,,19 However, those political
realities that establish policy in Nova Scotia include the need to exploit their coal
and hydro resources. In what amounted to a scandal in the mid 1970's, the Wreck
Cove hydroelectric project, a 200 MW dam in the highlands of Cape Breton Island
was constructed when a well-researched assessment was altered to make the
environmental effects appear to be minimal in the final EIS. It is perhaps
noteworthy that the Wreck Cove Project involved the Nova Scotia Power
Corporation, one of the original initiators of the Fundy proposals. This points to
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the all to common reality that sometimes a project comes under the EARP after
the decision to proceed has been made and where it is too late for assessment.
Other Regulatory Bodies with Authority to Review
Fundy Tidal Power
Regulatory authority for a project wholly within the United States or a joint
Canadian-American venture in Passamaquoddy Bay would fall under a number of
environmental statutes. However, as the project is now proposed, as one which
would be situated entirely within Canada, it would largely escape any type of
United States environmental regulation, even if, as its primary purpose, as
proposed, is to provide power to the United States and its very construction
dependent on American purchase power contracts. Such regulation and
environmental review may be limited to review of the economics of the power
purchase and review of the transmission line siting.
FERC
Under the Federal Power Act (16 USC 205 824) the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates wholesale rate making by utilities and
"is responsible for approving agreements between and among utilities for the sale,
transmission and exchange of energy and capacity")O However, the only express
authority over a purchase from a utility outside FERC jurisdiction would be in the
case of a request for a wholesale rate increase in conjunction with the
transmission of the power purchased.
If we assume that a purchase power contract with Fundy Tidal Power were
entered into by a. regulated utility prior to construction of the tidal facility and
that this contract became part of a rate filing at that time, it may be that a
challenger could claim that approval of the rate would be a "major federal action
significantly affecting the ' quality of the human environment" and subsequently
require FERC to prepare an EIS. However, this is highly unlikely for a number of
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reasons, including: (1) it would require that the rate filing occur prior to
construction, and (2) that the purview of NEP A be expanded to an en tirely new
area in an arguably inhospitable judicial and political climate for such action.
DOE
The Department of Energy, under the Federal Power Act, regulates the
transmission of energy to a foreign country and is mandated to assure that exports
of power will not "impair the sufficiency of electric supply within the United
States or •••impede or tend to impede the coordination in the public interest of
facili ties subject to the jurisdiction of the (Federal Power) Co mmission ."21
However, no comparable authority regulates power imports.
It appears that the clearest authority for regulation of the power imported
to the United States from Fundy Tidal Power would be Executive Order No.
10485, which provides, in part, that:
Section 1. (a) The Secretary of Energy is hereby designated and
empowered to perform the following-described functions:
(I) To receive all applications for permits for the construction,
operation, maintenance, or connection, at the borders of the United States,
of facilities for the transmission of electric energy between the United
Sta tes and a foreign country.22
Prior to issuance of the permit the Secretary of Energy is required to make
a finding that the project is "consistent with the public interest" and to consult
the Departments of State and Defense. Should the three Departments disagree on
a particular permit the matter is refered to the President. The permit may have
certain conditions attached.
Within DOE, the Office of Utility Systems of the Economic Regulatory
Administration (ERA) is the agency responsible for permit processing. ERA's
regulations require the agency to make a determination of whether there is a need
for an EIS when reviewing an application. Applications are reviewed for impacts
of the proposed facilities on domestic energy supplies and power reliability, as
well as for environmental impacts. The agency routinely prepares EIS's for major
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transboundary transmission lines but impacts other than power reliability and line
construction are generally not considered. These statements specifically, do not
consider alternatives -to construction of the line, although they may address
routing alternatives. Assuming the tidal power project had already been built at
the time of application for a transmission line permit, questions of impacts
related to tidal power development would be moot. However, if the permit were
required early enough in the process to encompass the environmental implications
of the United States investment in the Fundy Tidal Power project, and therefore,
the project's viability, then a NEPA review might address the coastal ecosystem
effects of the project. Should guaranteed access to the New England electricity
markets become a prerequisite to construction of the project and if construction
of a new power line is a prerequisite to assured access, then the possiblity for a
NEPA review exists.
Since the economic status and financial feasibility of the Fundy proposal
was based on "iron clad contracts for the sale of output" including a 90% output to
the United States, the likelihood for a NEPA review is greatly increased. This is
especially true if one assumes that any United States investor utilities would seek
the presidential permit prior to any facility construction. Taking this logic one
step further, assuming NEPA review did encompass consideration of the effects of
the tidal barrage, the Secretary of Energy could deny the permit if he found the
granting of the permit and the associated effects of the construction and
opera tion of the tidal power dam to be "inconsistent with the public interest".
Alternatively, he ,could grant the permit with conditions impacting the feasibility,
design, or operation of the tidal power project if such conditions were attached to
the permit.
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State Regulation-Maine
The primary regulatory agency in Maine for any supporting facilities
(transmission lines) which would be associated with tidal power development is the
Board of Environmental Protection (BEP). Under the Site Location of
Development Act, Maine's "NEPA", the BEP is charged with
cor-trolling the location of those developments substantially affecting the
local environment in order to insure that such developments will be located
in a manner which will have a minimal adverse impact on the natural
environment of their surroundings and protect the health, safety and general
welfare of the people.23
Since the definition of a development includes that "which occupies a land
or water area in excess of 20 acres," a major new transmission line would
certainly be covered under the Act. Such developments must obtain a permit
from the BEP prior to beginning construction. The standards for approval of a
,
development dictate that the developer show tha t:
I. he has financial capacity and technical ability to meet State pollution
control standards;
2. he has made adequate provision for traffic movement;
3. he has made adequate prOVISIon for fitting the development
harmoniously into the existing natural environment without adverse
effect on existing uses, scenic character or natural resources in the
area;
4. soil types are suitable;
5. ground water resources will not be at risk.24
Specifically, however, the statute mandates that
in the case of such transmission line or plpelines, (the board) shall consider
whether any proposed alternatives to the proposed loca tion and character of
such transmisslon line or pipeline may lessen its impact on the environment
or the risks it would engender to the public health or safety, without
unreasonably increasing its cost.25
Among the fifteen separate considerations which define the finding of "no
adverse effect on the natural environment" are those ranging from effects on air
quality to preservation of historic sites to effects on climate alteration.
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Expanding the language of the Act beyond the obvious impacts of the
transmission line and corridor, the regulations appear to allow for some
examination of the impacts of the tidal dam itself. The general Scope of Review
under the sta tute provides:
In reviewing applications for approval of proposed developments under the
Site Location Law, the Board shall consider the size, location, and nature of the
proposed development in relation to:
A. the potential primary, secondary, and cumulative impacts of land, air,
and water on the development site and on the area likely to be affected by
the proposed development; and
B. the potential effects on the preservation of the public's health, safety,
and general welfare.26
However evident this statute appears to address the potential problem, it is
unlikely that the State would broadly interpret the regulations as a basis for
examination of Fundy tidal power given tha t:
• to date, no cases interpreting the statute have addressed secondary
impacts
• State does not interpret its authority to allow consideration of
alternative methods and sites to proposed projects
• a recent Maine court determination interprets the statute as being
primarily concerned with very local effects.
A second regulatory body with jurisdiction over transmission lines is the
Public Utilities Commission (PUC). However, the PUC lacks authority to consider
,
environmental effects in the process of approving applications for transmission
line construction. Therefore, that body will not be considered further here.
The timing for application of permits for transmission line siting and the
e:
extent of public hearings associated with any related permits are probably two of
the most crucial factors in development of the Fundy tidal issue as it pertains to
transmission line siting. · · If the dam had already been constructed prior to
application, only impacts of a line itself would be considered. But assuming the
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permit were needed for a preconstruction purchase power contract, which would
probably be the case, then public hearings might attract a substantial amount of
opposi tion.
In conclusion, federal environmental legislation in Canada and the United
States do not allow for adequate assesment of projects with potential
transboundary impacts. While United States environmental impact assessment is
based on statute, the Canadian EARP is not. There is no guarantee that the Tidal
Power Corporation would have to be involved in the environmental review
process. On the provincial level, environmental legislation is largely influenced
by resource development policies.
It is questionable whether an environmental asessment of the Fundy project
would be triggered by the need to do an EIS on any new construction of power
lines associated with the project. Maine State law is similarly deficient in
addressing the problem.
Nonetheless, given the political pressure which the United States might
impose on Canada to undertake an EIS, the long-standing amicable relationship
between the two countries, and verbal assurances by the Tidal Power Corporation
to submit to environmental review, it is unlikely that an environmental
assessment or statement will not be prepared for such a major facility as the one
proposed for the Minas Basin. It is therefore useful to review past United States-
Canadian practices on a number of transboundary environmental problems to
examine how each nation has historically viewed protection of the transboundary
area.
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CHAPTER V
UNITED STATES AND CANADIAN PRACTICE
While a substantial amount has been written about transboundary pollution
and the obligation of states to prevent it from occurring, it is perhaps more
pertinent to examine actual practice between Canada and the United States on
. environmental problems they have encountered and how they have resolved their
conflicts in the past.
Possibly, the most amenable method of dealing with any potential conflicts
is the use of bilateral arrangements. Certainly, a new treaty could be negotiated
between the United States and Canada to deal exclusively with the Fundy tidal
power situation. This new treaty, could, as part of the agreement, provide for
some type of mechanism to address the special circumstances of the Fundy
project. In fact, however, an existing mechanism-the International Joint
Commission (JJC) has been in place since early in the century and might be the
ideal body to deal with the potential problems associated with -t he development of
tidal power in the Bay of Fundy.
The Trail Smelter arbitration was discussed previously as the precedent in
United States-Canadian relations for establishing the standard for the
responsibility of states towards protection of the transboundary environment and
will only be mentioned in passing in this chapter. The following discussion reviews
a viable dispute settlement mechanism which the United States and Canada has
employed in the past and looks at other prior United .States and Canadian practice
on a number of transboundary environmental incidents. These reveal that
overall, their outcomes further support the principles of the Stockholm
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Declaration. For a historical perspective on how United States environmental law
has evolved, reference is also made to United States practice with its other
neighbor, Mexico.
Early U.S. Practice
The Harmon Doctrine
One of the first and certainly most significant examples of United States
practice in the area of international environmental law involved a dispute with
Mexico over diversions of the Rio Grande river, north of the United States-Mexico
border. Mexico's claim that such diversions were unlawful were countered by
United States Attorney General Judson Harmon in an 1895 opinion known
subsequently as the "Harmon doctrine." Harmon interpreted an applicable treaty
to find that such diversions were not prohibited by its terms and that no
customary law duty prevented the diversions.
"The fundamental principle of international law is the absolute sovereignty
of every nation, as against all others, within its own terr ltory.v-
Attorney General Harmon interpreted the Mexican claims to be an assertion
of a right to restrict the actions of the United States within its own territory, and
therefore contrary to United States territorial sovereignty. Although he
recognized that the upstream diversion of water in the United States did cause
injury within Mexico (insufficient water for irrigation), Harmon saw no obligation
on the part of the United States to modify its actions and avoid occurrence of
transboundary injury. However, Harmon did recognize an obligation to avoid
causing injury by. creating downstream obstructions or diverting rivers which
caused flooding to a neighboring country, noting that flooding involved a physical
invasion of the other state's territory and therefore a violation of international
ob liga tlons,2
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The fundamental logical flaw with the Harmon doctrine as it applies to the
real world, and the reason it was never widely accepted, is that it contains a
contradiction within itself for if a state can exercise complete control over
activities within its territory free from other states, then it can also exclude the
entrance of transboundary pollutants. Not overly surprising is the fact that within
a year of Harmon's opinion, the United States was seeking to ensure that
diversions of the waters of Boundary Creek wi thin Canada would not be permitted
to damage the lands and properties of the downstream settlers in Idaho. The
United States position on upstream diversions as interpreted in the Harmon
doctrine ultimately was accepted and included as Article II of the 1909 Boundary
. Waters Treaty3 as was the prohibition of physical invasions (Le.; flooding) which,
in Article IV of that treaty prohibits downstream obstructions which raise water
levels in transboundary areas without approval of an international joint
commission. A discussion of the history of that treaty, its provisions, and the
treatys' working mechanism--the International Joint Commission--follows.
History of the International Joint Commission (IJC)
The need to deal jointly with certain environmental conditions was
recognized by Canada and the United States long before the environmental
movement of the 1960s and 1970s. At the 1894 and 1895 International Irrigation
Congresses held at Denver, Colorado, and Albuquerque, New Mexico, the
Canadian delegate introduced a number of resolutions which are generally
recognized as the genesis for the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 and the
International Joint Commission. Unanimously adopted by the United States,
Mexican and Canadian delegations, the resolutions recommended to the United
States "the appointment of an international commission to act in conjunction with
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the authorities of Mexico and Canada in adjudicating the conflicting rights which
have arisen, or may hereafter arise, on streams of an international characterv''
Subsequently, an International Waterways Com mission was formed in 1903,
between Canada and the United States. The commission functioned officially
from 1905 to 1913. In 1906 and 1907 the commission made a series of
recommendations to the Canadian and United States governments calling for
negotiations to be undertaken to adopt principles of law governing uses of all
international waters between Canada and the United States; the recommendations
also called for creation of an international body with authority to study and
regulate the use of these waters.5
Informal negotiations between two lawyers on the Waterways Commission
resulted in the formation of a special commission and a draft treaty in August
1907. After a great deal of drafting and negotiating, the Boundary Waters Treaty
was signed January 11, 1909 by the United States Secretary of State Elihu Root
and Britain's Ambassador in Washington James Bryce, on behalf of their
governments.v Both countries appointed Commissioners in late 1911 and the first
meeting of the IJC was held January 10, 1912 in Washington, D. C.
The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909
The purpose of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 is:
to prevent disputes regarding the use of boundary waters and to settle aU
questions which are now pending between the United States and the
Dominion of Canada involving the rights, obligations, or interests of either
in re1a tlon to the other or to the inhabitan ts of the other, along their
common frontier, and to make provision for the adjustment and settlement
of all such questions as may hereafter arise••.?
<
While there can be no argument that the Gulf of Maine-Bay of Fundy system
most certainly contains boundary waters given the 200 mile exclusive economic
zones which each country has recently proclaimed to be within its domain, the
preliminary article of the Boundary Waters Treaty indicates that it intended to
exclude these marine waters from being subject to the treaty:
For the purposes of this treaty, boundary waters are defined as the waters
from the main shore of the lakes and rivers and connecting waterways, or
the portions therof, along which the international boundary between the
United States and the Dominion of Canada passes, including all bays, arms,
and inlets thereof, but not including tributary waters which in their natural
channels would flow into such lakesg rivers, and waterways, or the waters of
rivers flowing across the boundary. .
It is perhaps unfortunate that the Boundary Waters Treaty as drafted was
not intended to include marine waters, as there are a number of provisions within
the Treaty which could be considered to be directly applicable to the proposed
Fundy tidal darns and would clearly provide for an authority to regulate such
activ ities.
For example, Article II of the BWT states that:
each [sta teJ reserves the right to exclusive jurisdiction and control over
the use and diversion, whether temporary or permanent, of all waters on its
own side of the line which in their natural channels would flow across the
boundary or into boundary waters; but it is agreed that any interference
with or diversion from their natural channel of such waters on either side of
the boundary, shall give rise to the same rights and entitle the injured
parties to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country
where such diversion or interference occurs; (but not applicable to existing
cases or special agreement).9
Article III, in part, contains another appropriate clause:
•••in addition •••no uses•••affecting the natural level or flow of boundary
waters on the other side of the line, shall be made except by authority of
the United States or Canada within their respective jurisdictions, and with
the approval, as hereinafter provided, of ajoint commission, to be known as
the International Joint Commission (IJC).l<T
Article IV of the Boundary Waters Treaty does imply that there is a ban on
pollution of boundary-crossing waters as well as "boundary waters" themselves,
but again is understood not to include waters which may 'flow' across an ocean
boundary. It specifies that:
The High Contracting Parties agree that except in cases provided for by
special agreement between them, they will not permit the construction or
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maintenance on their respective sides of the boundary of any remedial or
protective works or any dams or other obstructions in waters flowing from
boundary waters or in waters at a lower level than the boundary in rivers
flowing across the boundary, the effect of which is to raise the natural level
of waters on the other side of the boundary •••
It is further agreed that the waters herein defined as boundary waters
flowing across the boundary shal1 not be polluted on either side to the injury
of health or property on the other ."11
Article VIII delimits the jurisdiction of the IJC and provides for
compensation of transboundary environmental damage:
In cases involving the elevation of the natural level of waters on either
side as a result of .•.dams•.. the Commisssion shall require, as a condition of
its approval thereof, that suitable and adequate provision, approved by it, be
made for the protection and indemnity of all interests on the other side of
. the line which may be injured thereby) 2
In Article X we find what may be viewed as a mandate for the IJC to
consider the Fundy situation. Its provision allows other matters of disagreement
(besides specific boundary waters problems) between the two nations to be
referenced to the IJC:
The High Contracting Parties further agree that any other questions or
matters of difference arising between them involving the rights, obligations,
or interests of either in relation to the other or to the inhabitants of the
other, along the common frontier between the United States and Canada,
shall be referred from time to time to the IJC for examination and report,
whenever either the Government of the United States or the Government of
Canada shall request that such matters or difference be so referred. 13
The Boundary Waters Treaty is a remarkable document. In setting out
limitations on the freedom with which each country could act, it provided
safeguards on water levels and flows and pioneered restrictions on transboundary
pollution long before the environment became a popular concern. It provided a
forum for affected publics to be heard long before public participation became a
prerequisite for resources planning; it specified certain rules to govern the
settlement of disputes; and finally, its terms were broad enough to cover boundary
problems other than water, including those of air pollution, By far, however, the
author believes that its greatest contribution is its working mechanism, the
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International Joint Commission. It has withstood the test of time and has proved
to be one of the most successful negotiating bodies in history.
How the IJC Functions
The International Joint Commission is composed of six members, three from
the United States and three from Canada. The United States members are
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate. The
Canadian members are appointed by the Governor in Council of Canada. The
Commission is directed by U.S. and Canadian co-chairmen who serve in their
positions on a full-time basis while the other Commissioners serve part-time.
"The Commissioners conduct their business as a single body, not as separate
national delegations representing their respective governments, but effectively
seeking common impartial solutions in the mutual interest of both countries." l 4
Decisions are made by a majority of the Commissioners, irrespective of
their nationality. Although the Treaty allows for separate reports to each
government, the authors of the Treaty believed, as intended by the governments,
that resort to this provision would be infrequent and the Commission would
normally be able to function in unison to achieve equitable solutions in the
common interest of both countries.
This philosophy of impartiality has been extremely evident in the seventy
plus years since the Commission has been in existence. In only three of the 110
cases (as of July 9, 1985) which the Commission has dealt have the Commissioners
failed to reach agreement)5
. The Commission has three principle functions:
1. Regulatory - approves or disapproves applications from government,
companies, or individuals for obstructions, uses or diversions of water
which affect the natural level or flow of boundary water on the other
side of the international boundary or raise the level of transboundary
rivers at the boundary;
82
2. Investigative - Investigates questions or matters of difference along
the common frontier. These investigations and studies which are
referred to the Commission by the two Governments are called
"References." In such cases the Commission reports the facts and
circumstances to the Governments of Canada and the United States
and recommends appropriate action by them. The Governments decide
whether or not the Commission's recommendations will be accepted or
acted upon.
3. Surveillance/Coordination - Monitors compliance with the terms and
conditions set forth in Orders of Approval it has issued. When
requested by the two governments, the IJC monitors and coordinates
actions or programs that result from governmental acceptance of
recommendations made by the Commlsslon.Jv
Article X of the Boundary Waters Treaty also provides for the IJC to be
used as an arbitration body. It permits the Governments to refer any issues to the
Commission for binding decision rather than only for a report and
recommenda tions, However, in the seventy-five years of its existence, this fourth
function has never been utilized.
-e•
This can be partially explained by the fact that in almost all instances, the
IJC was able to resolve any problems by merely reviewing the facts, making
recommendations, and presenting them to each government in a fashion that all
parties concerned reached agreement on a course of action. In fact, since 1930,
only iive disputes between the United States and Canada have been submitted for
third party resolution. There appears to be a real reluctance on the part of
sovereign nations such as the United States and Canada to resort to judicial
dispute resolution mechanisms such as adjudication and arbitration. Given the
non-compulsory nature of Article X of the Boundary Waters Treaty, and the
reluctance to submit matters to third party resolution, it is questionable how
effective such a provision could be in helping to settle transboundary disputes.
Twenty-four bi-national advisory boards appointed by the Commission are
utilized to perform the technical studies and field work required to perform these
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functions. These boards include engineers, scientists and other experts, most of
them public servants whose services are supported by their agencies.
The IJC has separate headquarters in Ottawa and Washington, each staffed
with a small group of advisors and a secretary for each section. A permanent
binational staff is located in Windsor, Ontario to assist the Commission in its
responsibilities under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.
Although the Commission has worked almost exclusively on issues dealing
with freshwater resource issues, that is, questions of domestic and sanitary water
supply, navigation, power development, irrigation and pollution-there is
precedent for the use of the IJC for other issues. Indeed, as mentioned
previously, the IJC was involved in studying the Trail Smelter dispute and in 1928
completed a report on the case. Although the report was not accepted by the U.S.
the tribunal which eventually decided the case made an award similar to that
proposed by the IJC. In several other instance, the IJC has examined other air
pollution issues and has even become involved in acid rain research to some
extent.
There has even been a precedent set for the IJC to study tidal power. In
1948, the "IJ C completed a study on the feasibility of tidal power in
Passamaquoddy Bay, located between Maine and New Brunswick. Again, in 1956,
the Governments of the United States and Canada requested that the IJC
investigate the possibility of a cooperative international power project in
Passamaquoddy Bay. The International Passamaquoddy Engineering Board, a
technical board e~tablished by the IJC, ultimately concluded in 1961 that a tidal
power project would not be economically justified at that time.
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International Environmental Dispute Settlement
The settlement of international environmental disputes between Canada and
the U.S. has been the subject of many forums between lawyers and academicians
in the past. These meetings have resulted in numerous reports and
recommendations. Foremost among these are the environmental resolutions
adopted by the American Bar Association (ABA) and Canadian Bar Association
(CBA) in August 1979. These recommendations originate from a proposal
originated at a meeting of the section of International Law of the ABA which was
held in October 1974. Following approval by the CBA in December 1976, a joint
group of representatives of the two bar asoscia tions met numerous time over the
following two years and with substantial input from others in the field of
international law were able to come to agreement.
Their conclusions and recommendations will be analyzed in this section with
respect to the Fundy issue. Disputes between the two countries will be examined
from its principle components--avoidance, management, and settlement.
. As-has been pointed out, the solution of many disputes between the U.S. and
Canada has been made more difficult by the federal nature of the constitutional
systems of both countries. The more governmental units that are involved, the
more delays and complications of the issues occur. Any strain in the relations
within one country between the federal government and the governments of one
or more constituent units can also have repercussions on international issues. A
system of dispute settlement for the two countries .~hould reflect a realistic
appreciation of these federal complexities. In the United States, Congress must
stay within the jurisdiction given it under the Constitution, which specifically
enumerates what righ ts the states have. In Canada it is different; a case can be
brought to court if a provincial legislation impinges upon federal jurisdiction and
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vice-versa. While in the United States a treaty approved by two-thirds of the
Senate is binding on every part of the country, there is an inability of the
Canadian government to bind provinces in international treaties.
In 1978, there were more than 200 bilateral treaties and agreements
governing relations betwen Canada and the United States. Sixteen or eighteen
arrangements establishing bilateral commissions were found to exist, however,
more impressively, an American study "discovered a toal of 766 agreements,
understandings, and arrangements between Canadian prov inces and northern
states which had been arrived at without the intervention of either federal
government."17 Thus some provinces have acted internationally as quasi-
independent states in their relations with the U.S. government and its entities.
The majority of these are entered into logically between the provinces and states
(e.g., movement of firefighting equipment across international lines), to minimize
delays in bureaucracy.
There are, based on the long-standing relationship between the United
States and Canada, certain patterns of dispute settlement. These patterns are
shown in figure 6.
The mechanisms which have been employed in the past for dispute
settlement between Canada and the U.S. may be broadly divided into two
categories: (1) those which are binding such as arbitration and reference to a
permanent judicial tribunal; and (2) those which are non-binding. These non-
binding methods may further be divided into (1) those of a strictly bilateral
nature, such as negotiation and mixed commission; and (2) those which make use
e:
of third parties in some intermediate capacity--good offices, mediation, and
conciliation. Sometimes these non-binding measures may also be considered a
form of dispute management.
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Negotiation
Negotiation is the rule rather than the exception in U.S.-Canadian dispute
settlement. It has become a matter of practice and habit rather than a legal
obligation and there are very few areas in which the two countries are bound by a
bilateral instrument.
In almost all U.S.-Canadian practice in dispute settlement, some form of
strictly bilateral settlement is reached. However, not all negotiations or mixed
commissions are successful and in many of the most difficult disputes between the
two countries, unproductive negotiations have dragged on for years while the
problem has actually become aggravated or more complex (e.g., Garrison
Diversion and acid rain which are discussed later in this chapter).
"Negotla tions cannot, by themselves, constitute an adequate dispute
settlement system for two counties with a relationship as close, extensive, and
complicated as that of the United States and Canada." 18 The need for alternative
mechanisms to provide answers where negotiations fail has been recognized as
having the capability to increase the effectiveness of the negotiating process.
The use of the IJC's fact-finding function is an example of this. However, its
limitation is found in the fact that this use is only optional and cannot be
effective if not used.
Where a dispute is a legal one or has legal aspects, obligatory arbitration
may be the most efficient and equitable means of settlement. This may be
necessary where a genuine reconciliation of legally supportable conflicting
positions cannot be had through negotiations, and each side continues to escalate
the legal validity of its claim. In other situations, solutions may be reached
through negotiations where one side is victorious based purely on political
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advantage or bargaining power. Here arbitration can help reduce tension and
assure that a genuine and impartial solution is reached.
There are, however, at least two forms of negotiation to keep disputes from
arising, rather than using them to manage already existing disputes--prior
consultation and legislative or regulatory coordination and cooperation. Either or
both of these can be employed in the Fundy situation in an attempt to avoid a
dispute.
Prior Consultation
Prior consultation by the Canadian government with the appropriate
officials of the United States may lead to minor adjustments or accommodations
which can minimize adverse effects and thus prevent a dispute. Indeed, in the
course of research for this thesis, the author was surprised to find that despite the
intensity with which the Fundy proposals are being pursued in Eastern Canada
there has been no apparent consultation on this issue between the U.S. Secretary
of State and Canada's counterpart--the Minister of External Affairs. Yet, the
need for prior consultation is certainly a minimum attempt at assuaging an ever-
increasing and anxious public in New England.
Prior consultation has in a few cases--by Canada on energy plans and by the
U.S. on balance of payments plans and some anti-trust enforcement matters--
contributed to policy shifts which lessened the discomfort of the other nation.
The absence of prior consultation in other situations seems to have aggravated
matters even though settlements were eventually reached, The groundwork for
consultation on the Fundy project appears to have been laid. "An exchange of
letters in 1976 between the International Joint Commission and the two
Governments clarified the duty of the Commission to 'alert' both Governments to
any problems it sees looming ahead.,,19 However, at this point, this appears to be
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an empty promise since although the potential problems associated with tidal
power development in the Bay of Fundy have been the subject of numerous
scientific forums over the past three years, the IJC has not a t this point "alerted"
either Government about this potential problem)O In fact the DC may be
officially alerted themselves by the respective governments in the next several
months. As a result of the most recent meeting (June 1985) between the New
England Governors and the Eastern Canadian Premiers, a formal request was
made to ask that the President and the Prime Minister initiate a reference to the
IJC with respect to the feasibility and desirability of the Fundy tidal power
project)l Thus while the Commission is supposed to provide a form of prior
consultation, it is limited in fact by the amount of information available to it
from Boards and public sources, and this necessarily presents problems.
Aside from the few examples of prior consultation, there has been little
serious or sustained effort to regularize prior consultations between the two
Governments. The decision as to whether or not to consult has been left to be
made ad hoc by the responsible department or bureau officials. And if previous
experience with prior consultation proves itself true, there is li ttle to hope for
with regard to appropriate consultation prior to significant financial investment in
the development of tidal power. At this point it becomes increasingly hard to
stop the momentum for such a project. It is not unlikely to think that
commitments to the project, on the part of some, will strengthen to the point
where some Garrison supporters were.
The Joint ~orking Group of the ABA/CBA when considering the need for
mutual commitment to prior consultation for measures which might adversely '
affect the other party concluded that all of these determinations involved
political, diplomatic, and technical considerations, as well as legal ones.
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Therefore they did not recommend a prior consultation regime, but suggested
however, that such a regime founded on legal obligation should be given serious
attention.
Regulatory Coordination
The second method of dispute avoidance is the standardization of the laws in
each country which attempt to protect the environment. We have seen in an
earlier chapter that there are substantial differences between the environmental
laws in each country. Legislative and regulatory decision-making processes as
they exist today do not lend themselves to the kind of prior consultation described
above. Legislative and regula tory processes are more rigidly structured. One
proposed method of having disputes result from such projects with transboundary
implications is to involve the other Government in the process of making decisions
on the project. Each Government should enhance the possiblities for the other to
put its position before the legislative or administrative agencies preparing the
la ws or regula tlons,
Actual consideration of measures through clarification of standards or
meshing of laws appears to be especially appropriate in environmental regulation.
A potential mechanism for this coordination is offered by the existence of the
Uniform Law Conference of Canada and the U.S. National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Although this would undoubtedly be a
major task, it should be pursued as the environment is something we all share and
one must certainly conclude that dispute avoidance is preferable to any system of
settlement.
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Dispute Management
BHateral - Non-Binding Methods
The most common method of dispute management is negotiation-direct
bilateral consultation between Governments. However, given the nature of
federal governments as discussed previously, it can also be the most complex and
difficult. Not only may several departments or agencies in each government be
concerned with a particular question in dispute, those on one side may differ
among themselves on the same question. This is an all too common problem when
it comes to questions of ocean resource use as evidenced by the continual
interagency turf fights over the Outer Continental Shelf. Occasionally there also
arise problems in negotiations when a United States state and a Canadian province
are on one side and the two central Governments are on the other. Addi tionally,
well-organized or large-scale private interests sometimes play a role in
negotiations.
Increasingly, negotiations take place directly between what treaty clauses
refer to as "competent authorities" of each party. Such negotiations in the Fundy
siutation might be expected between the Secretary of Interior or Secretary of
Energy in the U.S. and their counterparts in Canada. The necessity of involving
the Department of State or Department of External Affairs has been minimized in
many instances by the fact that the two countries cooperate on a daily basis in so
many areas.
Where a problem is relevant or where a sltuatlon, particularly a technical
one, requires continuous oversight, negotiations may be institutionalized in the
c.
form of a mixed commission composed of an equal, often fixed, number of
representatives from each Government (e.g., the IJC). After simple nego tiatlons,
the mixed commission is the device most commonly employed to handle Canadian-
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United States disputes. The IJC is certainly foremost among Canadian-United
States mixed commissions and has been discussed earlier in this chapter.
The Use of Third Parties
In three methods of international accommodation, third parties are used in
intermediary capacities to assist disputants in reaching an agreement. These are
good offices, mediation, and conciliation and represent a borderline between
dispute management and dispute settlement. These third parties have no power to
bind the disputants to a solution, but merely advise, accommodate, and reconcile
in an effort to bring the parties to a bilateral settle mente
Both the United States and Canada are parties to the 1899 Hague
Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes)2 In 1914, the
United Kingdom and the United States signed an agreement which provides for an
international conciliation commission of five members to which disputes
(including those with Canada) could be submitted for investigation and report. A
1940 Canadian-United States amend ment provided for direct Canadian
appointment of its members to the commission)3
While ali of these methods remain available to Canada and the United
States, none have been used. The United States and Canada have not found it
necessary to use intermediaries to get bilateral negotiations started in light of
their longstanding basically congenial relationship.
Dispute Settlement
Where a settlement cannot be reached through non-binding procedures, two
binding methods .of settlement are available: ad hoc arbitration, the most
common form used, and adjudication through a permanent judicial tribunal.
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Ad-hoc Arbitration
Arbitral bodies are distinguished by the ad hoc appointment of members, at
least one of whom must be independent of the control of either disputant. There
are four types of arbitration which are commonly used: (I) the single neutral
arbitrator; (2) the three-member tribunal; (3) the five-member tribunal where one
arbitrator represents each side and the three others are neutral; and (4) the five-
member tribunal where each side is represented by two arbitrators and the fifth is
impartial.
The differences in the composition of the arbitrators on these tribunals may
produce important differences in the conduct of the proceedings and in the
nature of the result reached. The single arbitrator is free to arrive at a
decision which does not wholly favor either disputant. In the three-member
tribunal (or five-member tribunal where one is neutral), the independent
member does not have this freedom, since he must obtain the current vote
of one or two national members to reach a decision. Where three of the five
members on the tribunal are neutral, the influence of the national members
is minfmized. 24
Selection of the tribunal involves one of numerous selection methods and
sometimes becomes a complicated process in itself.
While the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions both contain provisions on
international arbitration, the 1907 Convention details to a greater extent the
powers and procedure of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, a panel through
which disputants may select an arbitral tribunal from. However, Canada does not
consider itself bound by it, but has accepted the 1899 Convention. The United
States ratified the 1907 convention with reservations that recourse to the
Permanent Court of Arbitration could only occur by, agreement to general or
special treaties qf arbitration which specified its use and rejected the Court's
power to formulate a compromise in the absence of agreement between the
disputants.
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There have been four ad hoc arbitrations between the U.S. and Canada this
century. The first was the North Atlantic Fisheries Controversy25 which was
refered to the Permanent Court of Arbitration and decided in favor of the United
Kingdom (l.e.; Canada). The issue involved fishing in certain bays.
The second case was the 1929 I'm Alone Case,26 in which a United States
revenue cutter fired upon and sank a Canadian private vessel, suspected of
smuggling liquor. Several of the crew were lost. Under the 1924 Convention
relating to the prevention of smuggling of intoxicating liquors, the case was
referred to two commissioners who reached agreement in reports in 1933 and
1935. The latter granted compensation to Canada for the unlawful act of sinking
and for damage to the captain and the crew.
The third and fourth cases were the Trail Smelter arbitration and Gut Dam
arbitration, both discussed elsewhere in this thesis.
Another case, the Alaska boundary "arbitration" of 190327 was not really an
arbitration but rather a mixed commission of six, with no neutral members: three
United States representatives, two Canadian, and one British. However, in a
-
controversial decision, the British commissioner did not vote with the Canadian
members and the boundary between British Columbia and Alaska was drawn in
favor of the United States.
Permanent Judicial Tribunal
The second and more formal method of binding settlement of legal disputes
is by reference to a permanent judicial tribunal. Thejmly general international
judicial body to which the United States and Canada both have access is the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague. While both countries have
accepted the compulsory jur isdiction of the Court, their acceptances are limited
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by substantial reservations. Canada's reservations include those made in their
1970 Canadian Arctic Waters Pol1ution Prevention Act28 which excludes
disputes arising out of or concerning jurisdiction or rights claimed by Canada
in respect of the conservation, management, or exploitation of the living
resources of the sea, or in respect of the prevention or control of pollution
or contamination of the marine environment in marine areas adjacent to the
coast of Canada.29
The Connally Reservation made by the United States in 1946 upon accepting
jurisdiction of the ICJ excludes, inter alia, "disputes with regard to matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as
determined by the United States of America,,,30 and "disputes arising under a
multilateral treaty, unless (1) all parties to the treaty affected by the decision are
also parties to the case before the court, or (2) the United States of America
specifical1y agrees to jurisdiction.,,31
Since any acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court is subject to
reciprocity, for all practical purposes, the two countries have at present no
obligation to submit disputes to the ICJ. The only use of the ICJ to settle a
dispute between the United States and Canada occurred in 1984 when the two
countries had their maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine delineated by a
special chamber of the ICJ. This Special Chamber consisted of five judges, one
each from Canada and the United Staates and three neutral members. The Court
found neither side's boundary position justified and established a line essentially
mid-way between the claims of the two states. Both parties have agreed to abide
by the decision.
Post-Settlement
Finally, there is the problem of following up on dispute settlement. There
presently exists no systematic monitoring procedure available for following up on
a particular dispute. In the cause of the Trail Smelter incident, the tribunal which
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decided the matter set up a procedure for monitoring local environmental
conditions, but there is no clear mandate to do so in normal arbitral proceedings.
It is generally up to the parties themselves to arrange for further supervision. An
analysis of the results obtained by recourse to various methods could help the
governments to improve their dispute settlement procedures.
Other Examples of Canadian-United States Practice
The following are some specific examples of Canadian-United States
practice in dealing with pollution or potential environmental damage problems of
the transboundary area. It is suggested that the IJC might have played a more
significant role in conflict resolution where it was used had it been employed at
an earlier point in the dispute.
The Cherry Point Oil Spill Incident
The precedent-setting Trail Smelter decision was thrown back at the United
States in the Cherry Point Oil Spill incident in 1972. A Liberian tanker leased by
the Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) leaked approximately 12,000 gallons of
crude oil into the sea while it was off-loading at the Cherry Point refinery in the
State of Washington. The oil eventually spread and washed up on several miles of
beaches in British Columbia. The Canadian Government took the position that the
mere fact that this private activity was carried on within waters under United
States jurisdiction and control, not that the United States itself was at fault, gave
rise to the responsibility of the United States to see that compensation was paid.
In a statement before the Canadian House of Commons, the Secretary of State for
External Affairs ifl Canada noted:
We are especially concerned to ensure observance of the principle
established in the 1938 Trail Smelter arbitration between Canada and the
United States. This had established that one country may not permit the use
of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury to the territory of
another and shall be responsible to pay compensation for any injury so
suffered. Canada accepted this responsibility in the Trail Smelter case and
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we would expect that the same principle would be implemented in the
present situation)2
The United States government, however, never did admit or acknowledge
any liability or responsibility in this matter, nor did it have to, as the problem was
ultimately settled by the agreement of ARCO to pay the costs of clean-up and
some damages. Therefore, while this incident gives us an insight into the
Canadian position on liability for transboundary pollution damage, it is not a good
example of customary law.
Canadian Offshore Oil Drilling in the Beaufort Sea
The acceptance of liability for transboundary pollution damage between
Canada and the United States is further exemplified by the way in which the two
countries approached offshore oil drilling in the Beaufort Sea in 1976. Alaska
residents, concerned about potential damage from Canadian oil activities in the
Beaufort Sea, requested the United States to enter into discussions with Canadian
authorities to assure that adequate safety measures existed and that
compensation funds would be available for pollution victims in Alaska. The
negotiations resulted in an agreement by Canada to guarantee the payment of any
compensa tion claim against the dr illlng -oo mpan les by .affected citizens in the
United States. Thus, Canada explicitly accepted responsibility for transboundary
pollution damage from activities within its control in accordance with customary
law.
United States and Canadian Practice with Respect to Flooding
As one of the principle concerns with the proposed Fundy tidal projects is
<
the potential for transboundary flooding damage, it is perhaps worthwhile to
examine United States and Canadian state practice with regard to flooding.
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On the southern border of the United States, the United States and Mexico
have entered into a number of agreements which address, inter alia, flooding in
each other's territory as a result of projects undertaken by each country)3
In the 1950's, two separate border incidents between Mexico and the United
States resulted in a diplomatic exchange of notes seeking corrective actions by
the other in response to the threat of potential transboundary flooding damage. In
the first incident, Mexico requested compensation for flooding damage which had
occurred and could potentially occur again as a result of the disrepair of a
drainage canal which extended across the border from Douglas, Arizona to Aqua
Prieta, Mexico. While the United States requested a joint study of the problem,
Mexico grew impatient and constructed a dike to prevent the canal waters from
'.entering Mexico. The United States State Department, in explaining the Mexican
action to the Douglas, Arizona local government, did admit that under long
recognized principles of international law every state is obligated to respect the
full sovereignty of other states and to refrain from creating such entities as the
drainage canal which causes injury to another state or inhabitants)4
In the other incident, the United States sought remedial actions by Mexican
authorities in the construction of a highway outside Tijuana which the United
States claimed could cause flooding damage due to inadequate embankments. In a
note to Mexican officials the United Sta tes urged Mexico to suspend work until
modifications could be made and concluded that the United States would "reserve
all rights that the United States may have under international law in the event
that damage in the United States results from the construction of the highway.,,35
A special agreement between the two countries for the joint construction of an
international flood control project for the Tijuana River eventually solved the
problem.
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The following is a specific example of United States-Canadian experience
with a Canadian project which resulted in flooding of U.S. territory.
The Gut Dam Arbitration .
As pointed out, only five disputes between the United States and Canada
have been submitted for third party resolution. Rather, most disputes between
Canada and the United States have been negotiated. In 1967, the Gut Dam
arbitration 36 occurred and provides the second example, the Trail Smelter being
the first, of an environmental dispute which was sent to arbitration. This
arbitration may serve as a basis for examining how the United States and Canada
might examine future transboundary flooding damage as a result of a dam project
on one side of the border.
In 1901 Canada constrcted the Gut Dam between Adams (Canada) and Les
Galops (United States) Islands in the St. Lawrence River.
As the dam crossed the international boundary, United States approval had
been sought from the Secretary of War and obtained, subject to the
condition that the Canadian Government indemnify 'property owners of Les
Galops Islands, or ...any other citizens of the United States' for any dama~e
or detriment incurred as a result of construction or operation of the dam)
In 1952, extensive flooding and erosion occurred on the United States side of
the St. Lawrence River. Affected U.S. citizens, attributing the damage to
construction of the dam, sought compensation. In October, 1952, eight of these
affected U.S. property owners filed suits against Canada in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of New York.
A note in November from the Canadian Ambassador to the Secretary of
State advised that the Government of Canada recognized in principle its
obligation to pay compensation for damages to the United States citizens
provided they were attributable to the Gut Dam, but requested the
sovereign immunity of Canada from such suits as had been filed be
recognized by the United States. The Department of State rejected the
Canadian request for recognition of immunity, but stated a willingness to
discuss means of settling the claims.38
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In April of 1953 the Lake Ontario Land Development and Beach Protection
Association which represented a large majority of the United States claimants
advised the Department of State that settlement of their claims by an
international tribunal was unacceptable and that it preferred to negotiate directly
with the Canadian Government.39 Finally, there was agreement to the tribunal,
but the plaintiffs were unwilling to accept the Canadian conditions that they
relinquish their suits in the United States District Court and accept the decision
of the tribunal as final adjudication. When the hearings began in October of 1955,
the Canadian Government decided to postpone further intergovernmental
negotiations until the suits were resolved. In 1956, all eight suits were dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. On April 22, 1957, the United States Supreme Court
refused to review judgment and issued a "Denial of certiorari." The State
Department then attempted to reopen negotiations with Canada for the
settlement of claims or for submission to an international tribunal for
adjudication and finally on March 25, 1965, the United States and Canada agreed
to an international arbitral tribunal to hear and disclose of the claims.
The Lake Ontario International Board of Engineers, a special investigative
board established by the International Joint Commission, had begun an
investigation of the problems created by the water levels of Lake Ontario and in
1958, six reports disclosed that a large number of factors, natural and artificial,
including construction of the Gut Dam contributed in a rather complex manner to
the damages in question in that they all affected the water levels of Lake
Ontario.
These studies disclosed that the highest mean monthly stage ever recorded
was 249.29' at Oswego for June 1952; that the effect of the Gut Dam at this
stage was to raise the water level .33' or 4 inches; and that without the
effects of artificial factors, including construction of the Gut Dam, the
mean monthly water level in June 1952 would have been 248.77'.
Eli minating the Gut effect, the level would be 248.96,.40
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When the issue of compensation reached final arbitration, it was found that
the liability question had been preempted by the intergovernmental agreement
made prior to the construction of the dam and the 1952 note from the Canadian
Ambassador acknowledging the obligation to pay compensation, provided the
damage concerned was attributable to the dam. Accepting the investigative
boards' conclusion that a certain amount of damage was attributable to the dam,
Canada did pay compensation to affected citizens of the United States.
This si tua tion is again illustrative of the way in which the two nations
address the liability associated with transboundary environmental damage and is
indica tive of the value of the IJC in a fact-finding capaci ty,
Recent Transboundary Problems
Garrison Diversion Incident
A prime example of Canadian-U.S. practice which may be particularly well-
suited as a comparison to the potential situation which might arise from the
development of Fundy tidal power is that of the recent Garrison Diversion Unit
conflict. Both projects involve massive developments which could result in far-
reaching environmental consequences. Although the two projects involve two
very different proposals, a number of problems associated with the Garrison
project may be similarly encountered in the Fundy project.
The Garrison Diversion as proposed in a 1944 compromise between the Corps
of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation involved a massive inter-basin
transfer of water originally designed to irrigate more than one million acres in the
Dakotas, but later. reduced in a 1965 Congressional authorization to only 250,000
acres in North Dakota. Since the diversion involved return flows from the
irrigated acres that would discharge into rivers entering Manitoba and eventually
Lake Winnipeg in the Hudson Bay watershed, the project became an international
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transfer with environment-affecting consequences, and therefore potentially
falling under the provisions of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty. However,
sponsors of the project, failing to appreciate its ecological and international
aspects, created a bitter international controversy.
Part of the problem may be explained by a lesser environmental (and
particularly) ecological awareness in both countries at the time of authorization.
Before the passage of NEPA with its ElS requirement, Bureau of Reclamation
engineers were not obliged to tell the American public (and especially the
Canadian public) all they knew about the side effects of the project. Thus, most
of the opposition to the project came later as people eventually discovered how
the project would affect their lives and property. Objections in the U.S. centered
on the adverse effects on migratory waterfowl, while opposition in Canada
concerned flooding along several rivers, degraded water quality from irrigation
return water, and unwanted biota transfers from the Missouri River basin. Lack
of consultation coupled with suspicions among many Canadians regarding the
intentions of the United States government led to bad feelings in Manitoba,
eventually becoming a national issue in Canada, while remaining politically
regarded as a local matter in the United States.
A 1977 IJC report by a specially established advisory board concluded that
no portions of the Garrison diversion should be constructed which would transfer
any Missouri River discharge into the Hudson Bay watershed. In August 1983, an
appropriation of $22 million by Congress was given to complete Phase I of the
Garrison Diversion which would not exceed 85,000 acres and would not involve any
transfer of Missouri River water into the Hudson Bay watershed. The State of
North Dakota and Bureau of Reclamation have maintained that as long as
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reasonable doubts exist regarding the effects of the discharge, that no Missouri
basin water will be discharged into Canada.
In August 1984, then Secretary of the Interior William Clark appointed a 12-
member commisssion headed by former Louisiana governor David Treen to
develop modifications to the Garrison Diversion project as authorized. Their
recommendations suggested that the project be scaled back considerably. It is
unclear as of yet what the final outcome of the Garrison diversion project will be,
although it is highly unlikely that a project of the magnitude originally authorized
will ever be constructed.
Comparison with the Potential Bay of Fundy Issue
In analyzing the Garrison Diversion controversy we see that there are four
interrela ting issues, at least three of which could be considered similar to those
that may be shaping the Fundy tidal power project:
1. The appropriateness of public action when major conflict exists among
the people affected;
2. the equity of allocating economic, social, and ecological burdens
among the people affected;
3. the adequacy of criteria to evaluate the technical, economic, social,
and ecological impacts of the project; and
4. the obligations of the United States rCanada] under the Boundary
Waters Treaty of 1909 as related to the previous three issues.
While it is too early to say what forum will exist for conflict resolution of
Fundy tidal power impacts assuming the tidal power facility proceeds toward
construction and the proposed environmental damage is incurred, it is evident that
a major constraint on the resolution of the conflicts associated with the Garrison
Diversion was the failure to find a mutually acceptable vehicle for conflict
resolution. Any resolution of the Garrison controversy to date has largely been
the result of scientific information. In fact, a review of most transboundary
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pollution incidents shows that scientific information plays a major role in conflict
resolution.
As issues associated with such projects evolve over time, it becomes
increasingly difficult for people concerned to agree upon the assumptions and
values that should be given primacy in the controversies. Furthermore,
agreement on the legal principles that might mediate their differences even when
a consensus exists on statistical facts is hampered by different perspectives on
how they should be interpreted. Thus the cumulative effect of these differences,
combined with commitments formed when a project initiates, lock adversaries
into positions that severely constrain resolution of their conflicts. As one
academic sta tes, "if future interna tional controversies, such as Garrison, are to be
avoided, an agreed-upon criteria for validated evidence will be necessary.n41
A major factor which characterized the Garrison Diversion is that it did not
appear to be controversial, or not significantly so, when the original commitments
to the projects were made. In the Fundy situation, while iron-clad commitments
have yet to be made for tidal power, a sizable commitment (investment) has
already been made by the proponent, the Tidal Power Corporation. In the
Garrison case, opposition developed as people who were previously uninformed,
neutral, or even supportive, later discovered that the project entailed costs and
consequences that they had not foreseen and did not like. Therefore, a conflict
situation arose between the people who stood by the original commitment, and
those previously unaware who now wanted the project to be reconsidered. It was
undoubtedly the use of scientific findings new to the issue that affected the
balance of public opinion. As new scientific evidence which invalidated the
original assumptions by which the project was being developed became available,
the appropriateness of public action became more questionable. Similarly, the
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question of the appropriateness of action by the United States which might violate
the Boundary Waters Treaty with Canada arose. However, regardless of the
validity of these allegations, the political circumstances under which the Garrison
project was initiated had changed.
The newly available scientific data and the prospect of an international
dispute did not change the minds of the North Dakotans who felt they should be
compensated by the government for lands flooded by the Garrison Dam, and who
realizing that Congress had authorized the project, felt the government was
obliged to promote economic growth in the region. One might speculate that
Nova Scotians might feel similarly about their proposed tidal project as there
currently exists a real need for economic development within the province and
there have at least been some assurances from government that tidal power will
be developed.
In the second issue, the equity of allocating burdens among those affected,
inequity problems arose from the underhanded manner of the federal government
in acquiring land for reservoirs and rights of ways and also from farmers who
suddenly became part of an irrigation district they did not want to be part of and
were subsequently forced to pay irrigation district tax assessments. Additionally,
farmers both outside and inside the projects' boundaries threatened with loss of
acreages for wildlife mitigation purposes were also angry.
The North Dakota business and government leaders saw Garrison Diversion
as largely an internal matter that was no one else's concern and that the federal
government was h?nor-bound to support. The equity issues could not, however, be
contained within the state's political boundaries.
The third issue, the adequacy of criteria to evaluate the impacts, is largely
a relationship between science and values. In the Garrison case, although the
106
criteria initially available for evaluating the consequences of the Diversion were
inadequate, they were substantially more adequate than the political basis for the
decision actually used.
The way in which science was used and not used in the Garrison case
suggests certain propositions regarding a reciprocal relationship between
science and values, and those conditions under which science may more
effectively inform and guide public policy. From a public policy perspective
science per se makes an inappropriate master and an unreliable servant, but
a useful teacher. There is little likelihood of Americans adopting public
policies solely upon the basis of the existing state of science. The common
attitude has been to regard science as a servant-as a handmaid to
technology. Public policies are usually adopted with little or superficial
recourse to scientific information, and thereafter science is invoked
selectively to reinforce a prior decision. Used this way, scientific methods
are unreliable servants of truth.42
Most of the active public that questioned and opposed the Garrison project
resided outside the state of North Dakota, removed from the social and political
constraints within that state, and therefore more affected by scientific evidence
than by legal rights or government promises. Ultimately it was scientists who
produced the evidence supporting conjectures regarding questions such as the risks
and consequences of interbasin biota transfer and that were inconsistent with
official opinion in the United States and finally through the environmental review
process were able to halt the project. Ir has been said that "economics may be
the ultimate modifier of Garrison, but science provided the delay that has given
economic rationality an opportunity to prevail.,,43
Whether the criteria for project evaluation used by the project's opponents
to stall earlier completion were scientifically valid could only be proven if the
project proceeded as authorized and its consequences later found. However, if
the consequences 'proved adverse as predicted, while science would be vindicated,
the environment would have already been altered. Therefore, the practical test
of adequacy of the criteria was political, not scientific.
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The final issue is the obligation of the U.S. under the Boundary Waters
Treaty. Although the U.S. government has never denied its obligation to honor
the Boundary Waters Treaty, there have in the past been ambiguities and
differences between the countries over the interpretation in Article IV of the
phrase "polluted on either side to the injury of the health or property of the
other". It has been unclear as to what constitutes pollution and who determines
when health or property have been injured and by what criteria. Inherent in the
terms of the treaty are potential conflicts over the criteria for determining this
"injury."
The IJC, when it was finally asked to investigate the matter, established the
Inter Garrison Diversion Study Board which established a number of technical
committees to study some of the uncertainties associated with the Garrison
project. Their recommendations, as stated earlier, were that no portions of the
diversion be constructed which could affect waters flowing into Canada. The
involvement of the IJC, as a bi-national neutral party with a reputation for
objectivity, was the critical event in bringing the controversy to a point of
tentative agreement although not to ultimate resolution. In effect, their position
was that the United States risked violation of the Boundary Waters Treaty and of
international law should it proceed with the 1965 authorization of the Garrison
Diversion project44 and the effects of the return flow into Canada be found to be
adverse.
The legitimacy of the original authorization in_ relation to the Boundary
Waters Treaty of, 1909 was never put to the test by the Garrison project. The
mere fact of potential pollution of Canadian waters by discharge from the
Garrison project was insufficient to establish a violation of treaty obligations by
the United States. Although the IJC findings identified threats of injury, actual
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physical injury could not have been established prior to actual occurrence.
Herein, lies a major problem which has been pointed out before as a deficiency in
international law.
A major question which arises in analyzing the Garrison controversy and
considering its applicability to the proposed Fundy projects is could the timely and
unbiased application of scientific knowledge and :methodology diminish the
likelihood of costly and frustrating controversies such as the Garrison Diversion
case? The author suggests it could and for projects with potential effects on the
United States-Canadian boundary, the IJC has proved to be a most appropriate
scientific investigative forum.
Although science is used in a pre-audit capacity in environmental impact
analysis and technology assessment it is often overlooked in attempting to
forecast impacts from large public works projects, more often than not because of
political pressures. The independence of a science pre-audit from effective
political or bureaucratic pressure is essential to its credibility. Furthermore, the
need for an international institutional arrangement for bi-national issues is a
logical inference from the history of the Garrison Diversion controversy.
International bodies are not directly politically accountable to popular
constituencies but they are to member States. The IJC is such an existing
institutional network with the capability to contribute to analysis of a very broad
range of scientific problems. The IJC's fact-finding functions were utilized in the
Garrison controversy to a greater extent than they had been in other
environmental iss~es arising betwen Canada and the United States.
Controversy over Garrison had been long and costly and in retrospect a
better way to have managed the conflict would have been in everyone's interest.
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In the end, an institutional arrangement with non-partisan participation became
necessary to overcome the constraints to conflict resolution.
Acid Rain
This section on Canadian-United States practice on transboundary
environmental relations would be remiss without some mention of the current acid
rain controversy.45 It has been felt for several years now that the United States
has been undermining Canadian efforts at controlling what most believe to be a
man-made problem.
Research indicates that as much as 50 percent of Canadian acid deposition
is of U.S. origin, but that nonetheless deposition occurs within the U.S. borders as
well. Possible explanations for the more pronounced Canadian concern include
that the area at risk in Canada contains more population centers than similar
areas in the U.S. and that the portion of Canada's GNP threatened by acid rain is
80 percent. Canada's economy depends heavily on forestry and fishing--prime
targets for acid damage.46
In the first annual report (1983) of the Congressionally mandated National
Acid Precipitation Assessment Program, science agencies for the first time under
the Reagan Administration publicly stated that man-made sources of air pollution
are probably the major cause of acid-rain destruction of lakes and streams in the
northeast.47 This report closely followed several blaring accusations in books on
the subject, including one which attempted to compare the governmental
responses to acid precipitation in Europe to those in. North America. Gregory
Wetstone and Arwin Rosencranz in an Environmental Law Institute Study entitled
"Acid Rain in Europe and North America: National Responses to an International
Problem," claim that alone among major pollution exporters, the U.S. continues to
view energy and pollution 'abatement programs as solely domestic matters having
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no impact in across-the-border environments of Canada.48 While Canada has
offered treaty language calling for a 50 percent reduction in sulfur dioxide
emissions and has agreed to reduce Canadian emissions by 25 percent whether or
not U.S. implements a similar program, the United States has, in the past
taken measures to thwart the negotiation progress by undermining the
science. By reshuffling key scientists at crucial points in the research
effort, by withdrawing support for the pivotal research area-control
strategies, and by insisting on unilateral review of joint scientific
documents, the U.S. is assuring 'divergent national viewpoints on what the
science says'.49
The United States continues to maintain the position that more research is
needed to adequately determine the cause and effect of acid rain. Clearly, the
relationship between Canada and the United States is not becoming any friendlier
in light of this continued stall. One wonders if it is not entirely unlikely to
consider that the Canadians may approach tidal power development with this in
mind and view it as an "arm-for-an-arm and an-environmental-damage-for-an-
environmental-damage" proposition.
Canadian-United States transboundary environmental conflicts have largely
been avoided by negotiation and the highly successful use of the International
Joint Commission, established by the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. On a few
occasions, the countries have had to resort to third party resolution of their
environmental conflicts. Large and complex projects with potential for
transboundary damage, such as Fundy tidal development, present special problems
for conflict resolution. It is suggested that the role of the IJC be expanded to
assess these types of projects prior to authorization.
III
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Review of the Problem
A major tidal facility has been proposed for the upper Bay of Fundy in Nova
Scotia to help meet the projected energy demands of northeastern North America.
On the surface, this project has some very attractive features which include being
a boost to the depressed Nova Scotia economy, helping to further a new
technology, and replacing traditional, non-reliable "polluting" energy sources such
as coal, oil, and nuclear power plants with a reliable, non-polluting energy source.
While there can be little doubt that construction of this facility would entail
significant environmental changes behind the tidal barrier, there is some
indication that because of the unique oceanographic conditions found in the Bay of
Fundy/Gulf of Maine there may also be some very significant environmental
changes seaward of the tidal barrier. In fact, it has been hypothesized that the
tidal regime could be altered as far south as Cape Cod, Massachusetts.
Accompanying this altered tidal regime are a number of projected effects on
coastal and marine habitats, some which are anticipated to be beneficial and
others which could be viewed as detrimental.
Should this be the case, whether or not these changes represent a form of
environmental degradation or pollution remains a question for lawyers. However,
there appears to be a growing body of groups and individuals concerned with the
protection of the environment that support more broad-based interpretations of
the term "pollution." Even if these projected changes were not considered a form
of pollution, under international law, there is a recognized obligation for a State
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to prevent transboundary damage from occuring. Unfortunately, this obligation is
generally not recognized as being violated until the damage actually occurs. This
is an all too common reality and, in the case of Fundy tidal power, certainly an
avoidable situation given the sophistication of present technology and the long
history of friendly relations between the United States and Canada.
Although numerous factors should be considered in determination of a
liability and compensation regime for this potential damage, such as the amount
of U.S. involvement in the project and possibly previous United States-Canadian
practice in other areas of transboundary pollution such as air pollution, the author
has tried to examine this issue primarily from the viewpoint that current
international and domestic law does not address transboundary pollution issues
adequately. Subsequently there are gaps in each which need to be filled if our
goal is truly to protect the environment. Furthermore, these changes need to be
implemented so that our current conflict resolution mechanisms deal more
efficiently and effectively with our transboundary environmental disputes. It is
hoped that by implementing these changes that the move towards the
interdependency of nations will be furthered. The author has suggested here that
the already existing, and highly successful International Joint Commission can
take the lead in implementing or aiding in many of these processes as they pertain
to the Canadian-United States relationship while other dispute settlement
mechanisms will require legislative changes within the respective governments.
When and only when these changes occur, can the U.S. and Canada serve as a
model for other < nations in their resolution of transboundary environmental
problems. Each of these areas will be addressed in the following sections with
some recommendations as to how they might be improved.
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Changes to Domestic Legisla tion
Replace Executive Order 12114
Existing provisions of NEPA and the Canadian EARP do not adequately
address transboundary impacts of major developments such as the proposed Fundy
project. While the United States environmental review process is somewhat
stronger than the Canadian EARP in the respect that it is statutory, its provisions
for considering international impacts are virtually worthless.
Executive Order No. 12114 fails to "further the purposes of NEPA" in
several respects:
• It fails to specifically acknowledge a statutory authority;
• It does not clarify distinctions between the "environmental impact
statement" it requires for impacts on the global commons and the EIS
required by NEPA;
• The assessment requirement for impacts upon countries "not
participating" in the agency action should not be additionally limited
to countries "not otherwise involved" in the action;
-
• The "multiple impacts" clause providing that if an action otherwise
requires an EIS and also affects the environment of a foreign country,
an EIS need not be prepared with respect to the latter should be
clarified; the Order should specify whether such impacts on foreign
environments are therefore excluded from all environmental
assessment, or alternatively, whether the situation requires two
separa,te documents using two different evaluation standards for the
same action; and
• It fails to provide for public access by citizens of the United States to
the foreign assessment documents it mandates (with the exception of
the EIS's required for impacts on the global commons, other
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environmental studies and reviews prepared under the Executive Order
are internal documents of the agency).
Executive Order 12114 should either be rescinded, amended by a new Order
to correct the deficiencies addressed above, or termina ted and turned over to the
Council on Environmental Quality (which originally issued the "Guidelines on the
Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements") to promulgate new NEPA
regulations. As reads now "The Executive Order creates a new environmental
policy which in many potential instances is not based on environmental concerns
at all."l
Once these changes are made, the United States should make every possible
effort in international law forums to have other countries adopt the EIS principle
with respect to their internal and external environment-affecting actions.
Generic guidelines establishing similar mechanisms for environmental assessment
review should be developed in cooperation with Canada (or any other nation) in
establishing a process for evaluating projects with transboundary impacts.
Revise Power Import Legisla tion
Existing United States environmental review of U.S. utility participation in
Fundy tidal power would be via the Presidential permit process which is required
and carried out by the United States Department of Energy for transboundary
transmission lines. However, while environmental impact statements are
commonly prepared for such lines, it is questionable under existing law whether an
EIS need be prepared to investigate the impacts of the tidal power project itself
which supplies th7 power to be carried by the lines. This possiblity exists even
with the likelihood that ninety percent of the power developed at Fundy would be
exported to the United States and funding may have to be provided by United
States utilities. Under existing U.S. law, regulation of power exports is much
more evident than regulation of power imports.
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The author feels that it is side-stepping the real issue, but nonetheless
supports legislation proposed by the Marine Law Institute of Portland, Maine to
amend the Federal Power Act of 1920 to consider all environmental impacts of
energy imports. Further support for Congressional legislation to address all policy
implications of energy imports, including environmental impacts before entering
into a contract for them is found in a September, 1982 General Accounting Office
report titled "Clear Federal Policy Guidelines Neded for Future Canadian Power
Imports." Specifically, the GAO report recommended that "the Secretary of
Energy work with the Executive subcabinet working group on regulation,
competition, and efficiency in the electric utility industry to establish clear
Federal policy guidelines towards Canadian power imports.,,2 However, the GAO
did not give adequate consideration to potential transboundary environmental
effects of the energy facili ty themselves.
The need for United States utilities to exercise control over energy import
activities is twofold. First, it is obviously needed to protect against potential
environmental damage and second it is needed because failure to exercise control
could be interpreted in international law as a consent to the damage and therefore
a waiving of the right to eventual compensation.
Coordinate Environmental Policies and Laws
Finally, it has also been shown that United States state and Canadian
provincial legislations lack the authority to adequately consider transboundary
impacts. States or provinces as a rule are only able to deal with "local" issues
since the applicable law in one state of province may differ from that of a
neighboring state or prov ince on the same side of the border. However, this is not
to underestimate the ability of regional agreements such as those between state
governors and provincial ' premiers dealing with matters of transboundary
importance. In fact, experience proves that numerous agreements between these
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groups have been the impetus for certain necessary and logical bilateral
interactions which take place daily. Furthermore, if it were not for a recent
meeting between the New England governors and the Eastern Canadian Premiers,
it is questionable at what point the tidal power issue might come to the the
attention of the respective foreign affairs leaders. This assumes that somewhere
in the not too distant future, these leaders will address this issue and possibly
refer it to the IJC.
It is beyond the scope of this paper, but the author feels it is not totally
unreasonable to suggest that at some point in the future, in order to protect and
use resources wisely that regional entities be created to deal with our resource
allocation problems more efficiently and effectively. A natural precursor to this
effort would be coordination of environmental policies and laws between the
nations. It has been suggested that the existing Uniform Law Conference of
Canada and the U.S. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws may be a potential starting point for this coordina tion, This concept is
supported by the fact that it would also help eliminate many of the legal
jurisdiction questions that presently exist. As things now stand, because the
judicial structure reflects the overall federal structure of each of our
governments, on occasion, because of overlapping legislative power, a
combination of national and local laws must be applied by the court in
determining the jurisdiction of a case, especially in Canada. By coordinating
environmental laws between the two countries, the question of jurisdiction will
occupy less of thecourt's time and it can address the real issues.
Changes to International Law
Strengthen Enforcement Provisions
International law has gone far in improving relations between nations and
establishing a body of principles and rules by which to peacefully coexist in the
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world. Foremost among these principles for protection of the environment are
those established in the United Nations Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment. While these principles of customary law are given much support in
numerous recommendations and resolutions, they are not binding and therefore do
not create a legal obligation. Thus while there is certainly a moral obligation on
states to see that exploration of their natural resources does not cause damage to
another state, there is really no legal basis by which to punish them should they
purposely pursue such activities which would cause transboundary damage. This is
not to suggest that Canada and the United States would not abide by any decision
made by the International Court of Justice in the case of transboundary damage.
However, ICJ compensation decisions for damage have been ignored in the past,
such as in the Corfu Channel Case where Albania never paid Britain back for the
damages incurred when Albanian mines destroyed British ships while innocently
passing through Albanian territorial waters. Thus a deficiency of international
law is the lack of enforcement, and there is a need to make sure injured states are
compensated for damage incurred.
limit Reservations to Environmental Treaties
Treaties are a second source of international law and differ from customary
law in that they place a binding obligation on states. Yet, it appears that
developed nations such as the United States and Canada are hesitant to have
limits put on their sovereignty and therefore they often resort to attaching
reservations or other amendments to treaties which in effect render them useless.
Of course while i~ is highly unlikely to suggest that either Canada or the United
States would purposely intend to cause one another environmental damage, this
does illustrate that there are indeed flaws in the treaty process which tend to
undermine the intents of international law. Reservations to environmental
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treaties are obstacles to protection of the global environment and should be
limited.
Make Prior Consultation an Obligation
Another flaw of international law is that it does not obligate states to a
prior consultation regime before the authorization of a project with potential
transboundary consequences. While the notion of prior notification is receiving
greater consideration in environmental law forums and has found its way into a
number of environmental treaties, including the Nordic Convention and the Law
of the Sea (Article 198), much work needs to be done to clarify which risks or
threats to the environment require pre-development consultation between
potentially affected nations.
Changes to Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
Transboundary environmental disputes between Canada and the United
States have been largely avoided due to the successful use of negotiations and
mixed commissions. Binding mechanisms for dispute settlement, arbitration and
reference to a tribunal, have only had to be used on a handful of occassions, This
is good, because these methods are largely inadequate for dealing with the
resolution of environmental questions. The Trail Smelter Arbitration is a classic
example of this. The case found its way into international arbitration because of
the unsatisfactory use of legal remedies that were otherwise available in the
United States and Canada. In the end, while the tribunal did award damages, it
was also asked to determine what future measures or- regime should be put in
place to mitigate. for further damage. Therefore it became an environmental
manager and to this end employed a technical staff to prepare a plan for the
future, which are clearly not true judicial functions.
As in most arbitrations, the Trail Smelter Arbitration was an extremely long
and drawn out process, which is typically another argument against the use of
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adjudication to resolve environmental problems. Others have argued differently
however:
Nor should we be influenced by the oft-repeated accusation that the Court
~nternational Court of Justice] is slow. In general, it moves at a pace
dictated by the parties and can hasten the speed of disposition in any case in
which there is good will on both sides)
However, despite these arguments against third party settlement of
disputes, there is some need for a form of compulsory dispute settlement when
negotia tions fail. Indeed as one international lawyer points out, "the threat of
compulsory adjudication is the strongest possible incentive for a rapid movement
toward a negotiated se ttlement.t'''
To this end, a Treaty has been proposed by the Joint Working Group of the
American Bar Association and Canadian Bar Association aimed at assisting in the
resolution of private disputes of a transboundary environmental nature. Such
might be the case should a New England coastal property owner suddenly find his
property disappearing as the result of the Canadian Fundy tidal dam. Key
provisions of this proposed treaty provide for equality of court access and
remedies. The Nordic Convention, which among other things provides for
reciprocal private and public remedies in pollution cases, helps serve as a model
here. Relevant articles of the proposed Treaty include: (1) an article on
definitions to assure that each country is in agreement on what pollution and
other terms mean; (2) an article which defines the rights of the persons affected
and which also includes resource to quasi-judicial adminstrative remedies; (3) an
article which allows environmental groups to represent the environmental
interests of their ' country; (4) an article which provides for advance notice to
persons in the exposed country. This effort by the ABA/CBA is to be commended
and such a treaty reflecting these provisions is encouraged, although as an
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alterna tive these articles could possibly be incorpora ted as a mend ments to the
existing Boundary Waters Treaty.
Expansion of the International Joint Commission
It seems plausible to believe that bi-national environmental issues crossmg
the Canadian-A mer ican border will con tinue to ar ise, and tha tit would therefore
be sensible to make provision for institutional arrangements to cope with them in
preference to reaching the point of suspicion and animosity which characterized
the Garrison Diversion issue and is somewhat prevalent in the current acid rain
controversy. The International Joint Commission is such an institutional
arrangement that has proven its worth many times over in the past seventy years.
The success of the IJC can be attributed to a number of factors:
• it has received strong support from the United States and Canada;
• it has been independent, neither being influenced by, or trying to
influence government;
• it is a permanent, not an ad hoc agency, which has allowed it time to
develop its technique;
• there is equal representation from each country;
• the countries are considered as equals despite the significant strength
advantage of the United States in population, income, mllitary
strength, etc.j
• it uses the best informed specialists of each country for assembling its
technical data;
• it is extremely pragmatic in its procedures;
• it has taken into account local and regional requirements where
appropriate
• its has anelernent of luck going for it, in that it was established prior
to water resource issues becoming a crucial issue; and
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• it was estabJished and is maintained by people of similar ideals and
ambitions.
In consideration of the above factors and our past experience with the use of
the IJC, the author suggests that the role of the IJC be expanded so that it might
playa greater role in transboundary environmental issues such as the evolving
Fundy tidal issue. The author is not alone in his advocating the expansion of the
IJC's powers. Among others, Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson,
representatives of the U.S. Congress, and a study discussion group called the
Canada-United States University Seminar have all recommended expansion of the
commission's functions for various different reasons ranging from tariff questions
to foreign policy issues.5 It is probably inappropriate at this time to suggest that
the IJC take on all these issues. However, without substantially increasing the
IJC's funds, personnel, and nature, the author suggests the following changes to
further what he believes to be a proper role for an agency with the goal of
protecting the transboundary environment.
The IJC should be expanded to allow it greater leeway in investigations and
decisionmaking on pollution issues with potential transboundary impacts. This
would mean two basic changes. First, the use of the reference process must be
changed to allow initiation of investigation at the request of just one of the
governments, as opposed to the current practice where both governments must
jointly request a reference. Secondly, the IJC recommendations must become
something more than just recommendations in order tobe further removed from
the politics of the Canadian and United States administrations. The IJC should be
authorized to make preliminary assessments of proposals with potential
transboundary implications prior to actual authorization and funding.
Furthermore, in keeping with the desired goal of prior notification and
consultation, the IJC should increase the public participation process and the
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availability of public information. In the Fundy situation, it might be appropriate
to hold a series of meetings throughout New England and eastern Canada on the
issue and the Commission's findings including alternatives. In this same context,
participation by non-governmental people on some of the commission's
investigative boards would be encouraged.
Lastly, the IJC must be allowed to utilize its never used arbitral function,
either by having automatic jurisdiction over any questions or differences that
either government refers to it, by permitting arbitration references without the
consent of the United States Senate, or by negotiating a new treaty or
amendments to the Boundary Waters Treaty to mandate some adjudication
process. One possible way in which this might be accomplished is by incorporating
a new tribunal of IJC personnel knowledgeable in Canadian, American, and
international law.
Summary
Fundy tidal power is an interesting proposition. On one hand it could be a
great boon to northeastern North America. On the other hand it might be opening
a Pandora's box. One academician writing on transboundary damaging projects
has noted that "scientific knowledge and associated technologies have vastly
enlarged opportunities for enterprises that reshape natural environments to
advance economic interests and political reputations. The costs of such projects
are often inordinately large in relation to the number of persons actually
benefited.,,6 Is Fundy tidal power worth reshaping the natural environment?
The problem of transboundary pollution is rooted in the reality of the
natural world. As a physical proposition, there is no difference between
international and internal pollution. The final realization must be that we all live
on one planet and we share a common responsibility to protect it.
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CHAPTER VI NOTES
1. Glenn Pincus, "The "NEPA-Abroad" Controversy: Unresolved by an Executive
Order," Buffalo Law Review 30 (January 1981), p. 661.
2. Testimony of Alison Rieser before the Senate Committee on Environment and
Public Works, July 25, 1983, Augusta, Maine in The Effects of the
Proposed Hydroelectric Project in the Bay of Fundy. (Washington, D.C.,:
Government Printing Office, 1983), p, 215.
3. Roland St. J. Macdonald, "Settling Our Canadian-United States Differences: A
Canadian Respective," Canada-United States Law Journal (1978), p. 17.
4. Ibid., discussion comments of Monroe Leigh, p. 26.
5. In the 1920s, Loring C. Christie suggested some method might be found to
adapt the IJC 'to the business of regulating the rum-running problem •••
or even to the immigration problem.' In the thirties, President Roosevelt
talked about referring the 'tariff matter' and 'a lot' of other things to the
joint agency. In 1963, Judge Norris recommended that during the period
of the proposed trusteeship for Canadian maritime transportation unions,
'the matter of the harassment of Canadian vessels in l,l.S. ports' be
referred to the IJC for study and report. In the mid-sixties, the
Merchant-Heeney Report, drafted at the request of President Lyndon
Johnson and Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, suggested that the two
governments 'examine jointly the wisdom and feasibility of extending the
Commission's functions;' while the 'Tupper Report,' prepared by ten
Republican 'moderates' in the House of Representatives, recommended
that the IJC be asked to add 'facilities for the joint study of technical
aspects of foreign policy issues between the two countries' and be
requested 'to make recommendations for a continental program of water
sharing and hydroelectric power development.' The Canada-United
States University Seminar has recommended the Commission's functions
be expanded to encompass certain responsibilities relative to policy
formulation, planning, and management to the water and associated land
resources of the Great Lakes Basin.
6. Lynton K. Caldwell, "Garrison Diverson: Constraints on Conflict Resolution,"
Natural Resources Journal 24, (October 1984), p. 843.
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